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SILENCE, CONFESSIONS, AND THE NEW 
ACCURACY IMPERATIVE 
LISA KERN GRIFFIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Silence is both overpriced and underrated. This Article assesses the 
status of silence in light of renewed attention to reliability in criminal 
procedure. First, it considers the meaning of silence, both outside of 
the criminal justice process and within it. The Article then describes 
how silence can safeguard the context of confessions by making space 
for suspects to choose or reject engagement while shielding the content 
of statements from government manipulation. This account seeks to 
advance the discussion about protecting silence beyond the debate as 
to whether it advantages the innocent or the guilty. Empirical 
developments concerning wrongful convictions establish that factually 
innocent defendants do make false confessions, that the government 
often co-authors those statements, and that errors occur because the 
cost to defendants of staying silent is too high. The Article concludes 
by evaluating both exclusionary rules and law enforcement regulation 
that could better protect silence and, in doing so, enhance accuracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “right to silence” figures prominently in both criminal 
procedure and popular culture about the criminal justice system, but 
neither silence itself nor any such right actually exists.1 This Article 
explores the content of attempted silence, its function in 
interrogations, and the emerging connection between making space 
for silence and improving accuracy. It argues that the failure to 
understand and defend silence allows law enforcement to insert 
material into suspects’ statements and, in doing so, to introduce error 
into criminal adjudication. 
Many representations of silence outside of the criminal justice 
process illuminate two important aspects of the failure to protect it in 
interrogations. Silence is both unattainable and interactive. Its 
complexities begin to emerge from consideration of the silent 
symphonies and blank canvases of postmodern art,2 which expose 
silence as so dynamic that it can never be perfected. There is always 
substance to silence, including information and engagement for the 
listener confronted with it. As performances of silence in the arts 
demonstrate, the audience adds content to silence both deliberately 
and inadvertently, and can later mistake those contributions for 
original statements by the performer. 
Legal rules have not accounted for either the distinction between 
silence and emptiness or the inaccuracies that can flow from the 
moment that silence is breached. As the privilege against self-
incrimination continues to contract, its diminished protections can be 
traced in part to misperceptions about what silence communicates, 
 
 1. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182–83 (2013) (stating that “misconceptions 
notwithstanding, the Fifth Amendment . . . does not establish an unqualified ‘right to remain 
silent’”). 
 2. See John Cage, 4’33” (1952). 
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and about the response that it can provoke from law enforcement. 
Silence currently counts, for example, as an affirmative admission of 
guilt if a suspect remains silent instead of proffering anticipated 
denials.3 Moreover, although a suspect cannot achieve a romantic 
conception of pure silence,4 when stillness fails, the broken silence 
itself constitutes waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.5 
Police leverage this perceived acquiescence while disregarding the 
signaled desire to separate from interrogators.6 
Overriding attempted silence can lead, however, to jeopardizing 
reliability. Suspects rarely succeed in imposing silence on 
interrogators engaged in aggressive questioning, and prolonged 
questioning is a strategy that can turn a suspect’s noncompliance into 
a false confession. When law enforcement breaches silence at critical 
junctures in interrogations, co-authored confessions—containing 
known and anticipated elements that investigators themselves 
generate—often result. And statements with substantial content 
provided by the government can indicate both involuntariness and 
inaccuracy.7 
Recent data attributing wrongful convictions to false confessions 
sheds new light on the way in which silence itself can protect 
innocence.8 Growing evidence from DNA exonerations has 
established that the problem of wrongful convictions is substantial, 
and that a significant number of those errors can be traced to 
government participation in the production of a suspect’s statement.9 
The new empirical moment in criminal procedure scholarship thus 
creates an opportunity to revisit the rules surrounding silence and the 
way in which they connect to reliability. With the occurrence of error 
 
 3. Salinas, 133 S. Ct at 2182. 
 4. See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK 
RIVERS 392 (Carl F. Hovde, William L. Howarth & Elizabeth Hall Witherell eds., 1980) 
(describing silence as the “universal refuge”).  
 5. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388–89 (2010).  
 6. The facts of Thompkins, id. at 374–77, illustrate this approach. 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(recognizing that a defendant’s willingness to adopt responses suggested by the government 
constitutes evidence of involuntariness).  
 8. See Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 396 
(2015) (stating that many recent cases of DNA-based exonerations have been “dominated by 
false confessions”). 
 9. See id. (explaining that “recently exposed false confessions were seemingly detailed—
containing information that police had said only the true culprits could have known”).  
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in criminal adjudication no longer a theoretical issue, the real gains 
and low costs of making more space for silence are easier to calculate. 
This closer look at what silence consists of, how it communicates, 
and what occurs when it is breached suggests a reconceptualization of 
the measures that protect it. Part I of the Article describes artistic 
representations of silence to begin to give it some content and make it 
possible to “listen” to the signals that silence sends. It then assesses 
the legal meaning of silence in investigations in light of this broader 
cultural context. In Part II, the Article links silence and accuracy in 
order to move the debate about the scope of the right to remain silent 
beyond speculation on whether it benefits innocent or guilty 
defendants. Empirical developments on false confessions establish 
that there are “known innocents” who attempted silence, and their 
cases raise the possibility that a more robust right to silence could 
decrease wrongful convictions. Part III addresses potential reforms to 
both legal standards and law enforcement methods that would raise 
the status of silence in investigations and better protect against error. 
I.  ATTEMPTED SILENCE 
A. No Such Thing as Silence 
Silence is not simple. Reevaluating its constitutional status first 
requires a fuller theory of what it means. Reflections on silence in 
other contexts help illuminate its distinction from blankness, its 
communicative function, and the way in which failed attempts at 
silence conflate speaker and listener. 
Performers and visual artists have long explored the impossibility 
of pure silence. Consider, for example, composer John Cage’s work 
4’33”. When it was first presented in 1952, it consisted of a virtuoso 
pianist, David Tudor, sitting at the piano for four minutes and thirty-
three seconds without striking a note.10 Commonly known as the 
“silent” piece, Cage’s composition includes three movements.11 Tudor 
raised and lowered the piano lid at the beginning and end of each 
movement, measured the passing time with a stopwatch, and turned 
 
 10. See JOHN CAGE, 4’33” 1960 TYPED “TACET” VERSION (1960), reprinted in 4’33”: JOHN 
CAGE CENTENNIAL EDITION 2 (2012). 
 11. Alex Ross, Searching for Silence: John Cage’s Art of Noise, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 
2010, at 52, 52.  
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several pages of the score during the performance.12 Each time the 
piece is presented, the performer or performers—the score is written 
for a single instrument, an ensemble, or an orchestra—receive 
instructions to produce no intentional sounds at all.13 But of course, 
though the orchestra appears silent, members of the audience are not. 
The inevitable murmurs and rustles from the listeners, as well as 
incidental sounds in the concert hall, form part of the composition.14 
In Cage’s words, the project sought to demonstrate that there is “no 
such thing as silence.”15  
There is no such thing as silence because the performer cannot 
maintain it, and the audience cannot avoid filling it. Government-
created evidence in criminal cases similarly arises both from 
supplementing suspects’ own words and from imputing facts to 
suspects that do not originate with them. Documented false 
confessions suggest that when the government presses past attempted 
silence, it has not so much overcome it as replaced it with evidence of 
the government’s own making.16 Preventing that inaccuracy begins 
with understanding what silence is and does, and work like Cage’s 
aids comprehension. The primary substance of any performance of 
4’33” comes from the audience’s search for patterns in the 
background noise and from the experience of adding its own ambient 
sounds. Cage demonstrated how intentional and unintentional sound 
merge in a composition and can change a work each time it is 
performed. 
 
 12. See Andrew Kania, Silent Music, 68 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 343, 344 (2010) 
(detailing a reconstruction of the piano score used at the premiere, which consists of “treble- 
and bass-clef staves that contain no notes or rests,” bar lines, and graphic measurement of time).  
 13. Cage also provided that 4’33” could be “performed by any instrumentalist or 
combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time.” CAGE, supra note 10; see also 
WILLIAM FETTERMAN, JOHN CAGE’S THEATRE PIECES: NOTATIONS AND PERFORMANCES 79–
80 (1996) (noting that, whatever the length, the piece is still called 4’33”).  
 14. For extended discussions of 4’33”, see generally KYLE GANN, NO SUCH THING AS 
SILENCE: JOHN CAGE’S 4’33” (2010), and LYDIA GOEHR, THE IMAGINARY MUSEUM OF 
MUSICAL WORKS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC (2007). 
 15. Ross, supra note 11, at 52. According to Cage, the earliest inspiration for the piece was 
his experience in an anechoic chamber, where he determined that silence was more than the 
absence of sound. John Cage, Autobiographical Statement (1990), http://www.johncage.org/auto
biographical_statement.html [http://perma.cc/2554-DN97]. 
 16. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009) (“[T]here is mounting empirical 
evidence that [interrogation tactics] can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to 
confess to crimes they never committed.”); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 18 (2011) (“In a coerced-compliant 
confession, the pressure police apply during the interrogation may not be illegal, and it may 
come from tactics that judges have approved.”).  
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Recent revivals of Yves Klein’s more elaborate Monotone-
Silence Symphony again underscore the co-authorship of listener and 
performer.17 Swiss composer Roland Dahinden recently conducted 
the piece with seventy performers—cellists, violinists, bassists, flutists, 
oboists, French horn players, and singers—all filling the air for twenty 
minutes with a single note played without vibrato or variation, 
followed by twenty minutes of silence. In the silence, Dahinden 
explains, “[y]ou sit in the audience and you start to hear some 
melodies and some fragments of melodies, and yet nobody is playing 
them.”18 
Silent music is but one example of the impossibility of creating 
and preserving silence, and other media similarly experiment with the 
way silence can shift attention from the performer to the 
surroundings and the audience. 4’33” reversed the conventional 
direction of music, and was both highly controversial and hugely 
influential.19 Postmodern visual art owes a particular debt to the silent 
symphony, and its reconstructed score was the centerpiece of a recent 
exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art.20 The exhibit, entitled There 
Will Never Be Silence, explores chance operations like ambient and 
involuntary noises in music, and the indeterminacy of monochrome 
 
 17. YVES KLEIN, Monotone-Silence Symphony (1949). 
 18. Randy Kennedy, A Sound, Then Silence (Try Not to Breathe): Yves Klein’s ‘Monotone-
Silence’ Symphony Comes to Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at C1; see also id. (“‘You 
get into the deepness of a silence and you realize that silence is not a nothing,’ [Daniel Moquay, 
director of the Klein archive and estate] said.”). 
 19. Ross, supra note 11, at 53 (noting that “Cage’s radicalism was lifelong and unrelenting” 
and that “he took the path of most resistance”). 4’33”, as Kyle Gann describes, was viewed by 
many as a step too far and affected Cage’s reputation as a “serious composer.” GANN, supra 
note 14, at 121. More recently, 4’33” has even inspired digital silence. The entire piece was 
“broadcast” on BBC radio in 2004, and various silent tracks are now available for download on 
iTunes. Cage’s publishers also engaged in a playful copyright dispute with British composer 
Mike Batt, who included “A One Minute Silence” as a blank track on the album “Classical 
Graffiti” by the rock band The Planets. See Mike Batt, Postman Batt Breaks Silence on Silence, 
MADHOUSE RAG (Dec. 11, 2010), http://madhouserag.com/postmanbatt/postman-batt-breaks-
silence-on-silence [http://perma.cc/JG2J-9FMW]. Batt issued a statement claiming that his 
silence was superior because it “said in one minute” what it took Cage four minutes and thirty-
three seconds to say. See Composer Pays for Piece of Silence, CNN (Sept. 23, 2002, 12:21 PM), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/SHOWBIZ/Music/09/23/uk.silence [http://perma.cc/LWF8-ZNDX].  
 20. See Corinna da Fonseca-Wollheim, Visual Portents of a Silent Bolt of Thunder: 
MoMA’s ‘There Will Never Be Silence,’ About John Cage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2014, at C1 
(describing the exhibit). Visual artists including Marcel Duchamp, Kurt Schwitters, Robert 
Morris, Lawrence Weiner, Yoko Ono, and Andy Warhol reference Cage’s work. Id. As Walter 
De Maria, a sculptor who completed a stainless-steel work entitled Cage II wrote, “I never did 
like his music actually. But the ideas were always well stated.” Id. 
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canvases and found objects as well.21 Cage himself was influenced by 
Marcel Duchamp’s “ready-made” art and his inversion of content and 
context22 as well as the smooth, unarticulated white canvases of 
another frequent collaborator, Robert Rauschenberg.23 Rauschenberg 
stripped out the anticipated elements of “art” to show the interaction 
between the “silent” paintings and “the light and dust particles in the 
air.”24 
Filmmakers have further investigated the texture of silence and 
complicated its meaning. A 1964 film by Nam June Paik—Zen for 
Film—consists of a projection of a roll of clear film, punctuated by 
the sound of the projector and the dust on the film itself.25 Samuel 
Beckett wrote and directed Film, which runs twenty-four minutes 
without dialogue or background music.26 Modernist writers from 
Virginia Woolf to Harold Pinter also exposed the inevitable 
expressive functions of silence between people and within 
conversations.27 Performance artists have not only given silence 
concrete form but also commodified it. For Yves Klein’s 1958 
exhibition Le Vide (The Void), he purged a small Parisian gallery of 
every object within it, scrubbed it clean, and painted it pure white.28 
He declared the “invisible pictorial state” to be “endowed with 
autonomous life” and proceeded to sell several copies of a work he 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See DAVID TOOP, SINISTER RESONANCE: THE MEDIUMSHIP OF THE LISTENER 69 
(2010) (quoting a fragment attributed to Marcel Duchamp stating that “[o]ne can look at seeing; 
one can’t hear hearing”). 
 23. Robert Rauschenberg, White Paintings (1951). 
 24. See da Fonseca-Wollheim, supra note 20; see also JOHN CAGE, SILENCE: LECTURES 
AND WRITINGS 102 (1961) (describing the paintings, which appear to be blank, white canvases, 
as “reflective surfaces changing what is seen by means of what is happening” and “airports for 
the lights, shadows, and particles”). 
 25. Nam June Paik, Zen for Film (1964). 
 26. Samuel Beckett, Film (1965). Beckett intended the film to demonstrate that the act of 
“being” necessarily includes “being perceived.” See id. On the impossibility of silence, see also 
AD REINHARDT, Twelve Rules for a New Academy, in ART-AS-ART: THE SELECTED WRITINGS 
OF AD REINHARDT 104 (Barbara Rose ed., 1975) (“No such thing as emptiness / or invisibility, 
silence . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE (1953); HAROLD PINTER, SILENCE 
(1969); see also BERNARD P. DAUENHAUER, SILENCE: THE PHENOMENON AND ITS 
ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE 4–5 (1980) (describing, in the context of Pinter plays, negative 
silence that punctuates speech and positive silence that states and shifts themes); TOOP, supra 
note 22, at 200 (discussing silence in the work of William Faulkner and Virginia Woolf).  
 28. Rebecca Solnit, Yves Klein and the Blue of Distance, 26 NEW ENG. REV., no. 2, 2005, at 
176, 178. 
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called the Zone of Immaterial Pictorial Sensibility.29 Though patrons 
paid (in gold) for their copy of the piece, they received nothing 
tangible in exchange.30 
Theorizing the content and function of silence itself gives rise to 
new thinking about suspects and defendants who try but fail to 
remain silent. If there is no such thing as silence, then a privilege 
extended only to those who remain perfectly silent is a hollow one. 
Moreover, the performances of silence in other realms, as 
demonstrated by the work of John Cage and his contemporaries, 
reveal that it is never inert, and that when silence attempts but does 
not achieve separation, then the listener inevitably begins to construct 
meaning. That constructed meaning links the low status of attempted 
silence with the danger of unreliable statements. Law enforcement’s 
interaction with silence is a key source of inaccuracy and wrongful 
convictions. Cage’s work elucidates why that occurs. As he explained, 
“[T]ry as we may to make a silence, we cannot.”31 A more ample 
theory of silence also illuminates how deceptive the sounds around it 
can be, and thus how overriding attempted silence can enlarge the 
problem of government-created evidence. 
B. Silence and Separation 
Although the connection between silence and autonomy has long 
been recognized, understanding that it is impossible to sustain pure 
silence, and that much is lost when the attempt goes unrecognized, 
puts a new gloss on the significance of silence. Silence indicates the 
need for a space within which to make choices.32 It protects “freedom 
to choose what to say to whom and when to say it,”33 and it leaves 
room for individuals to form their own plans.34 Silence preserves an 
 
 29. Id. at 178–79. 
 30. Id. 
 31. CAGE, supra note 24, at 8.  
 32. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 24 (2007) (stating that it 
is ultimately “deep and terrifying silence that constitutes our declaration of independence from 
the will of others”).  
 33. Austin Sarat, Introduction: Situating Speech and Silence, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW 1, 3 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010). But see PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING 
CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 82 (2000) (calling into question the 
existence of a “choosing subject” in the context of a police interrogation). 
 34. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 3 (stating that “silence protects the freedom to choose 
between public obligation and private commitment”); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the “right to be let alone” as “the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”). 
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interior realm, mental privacy, and introspection. Allowing silence to 
separate thus gives effect to the autonomy rationales that partly 
animate the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Supreme Court has 
stated that an individual should have the right “to remain silent unless 
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”35 
Indeed, the majority opinion in Miranda v. Arizona36 references the 
concept of free choice nine times.37 
Attempted silence signifies this desire to create a boundary; it is 
a statement at least about the choice to remain separate. Silence per 
se may not exist, but the effort to maintain it creates a border 
between the self and interrogators.38 That same border often 
separates accurate and inaccurate statements and thus merits stronger 
protection. The autonomy and reliability principles behind Fifth 
Amendment protections converge in the space that silence creates 
between a suspect’s own words and confessions co-authored by the 
government. 
Yet common interrogation tactics and narrowing constitutional 
constructions of the right to claim silence both operate to close that 
gap. Questioners crowd the suspect’s space and override the appeal 
for separation. The interrogation room itself imposes physical limits: 
It is small and enclosed, and one can sit there for an extended period 
of time.39 As the Supreme Court described in Miranda, the 
environment of a typical interrogation is “compelling,” “secret,” 
“isolated,” “menacing,” and “police-dominated.”40 A longstanding 
approach to breaking silence is to establish a sense that questioner 
 
 35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 
(1964)). 
 36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 37. Id. at 457–58, 465, 474; see also William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
975, 976 (2001) (“Miranda left it for suspects to decide, by either agreeing to talk or by calling a 
halt to questioning and/or calling for the help of a lawyer, whether the police were behaving too 
coercively.”). 
 38. See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, The Aesthetics of Silence, in A SUSAN SONTAG READER 181, 
187–88 (1983) (“One recognizes the imperative of silence, but goes on speaking anyway. 
Discovering that one has nothing to say, one seeks a way to say that.”). 
 39. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
134 (2012) [hereinafter SIMON, IN DOUBT] (“Interrogations are conducted in specially designed 
rooms that are small, windowless, and secluded.”); DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE 
KILLING STREETS 210 (1991) [hereinafter SIMON, HOMICIDE] (describing the interrogation 
room as “four yellow cinderblock walls, a dirty tin ashtray on a plain table, a small mirrored 
window and a series of stained acoustic tiles on the ceiling”). 
 40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 457, 461 & 470. 
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and suspect are alone together.41 The “quiet room” is a related 
paradigm in interrogation techniques, designed to convey intimacy.42 
In writer David Simon’s iconic descriptive work on the Baltimore 
Homicide Department’s tactics, he reports that this illusion of privacy 
distorts “the natural hostility between hunter and hunted, 
transforming it until it resembles a relationship more symbiotic than 
adversarial.”43 Conflating the speakers in a distorted exchange often 
yields unreliable evidence. 
This occurs in part because, given interrogators’ expectations and 
experiences, sustained silence can surprise them. In a culture where 
data increases exponentially,44 interrupting the anticipated flow of 
information requires careful, affirmative steps.45 That resistance is a 
procedural move, however—an insistence on differentiating oneself.46 
It “expresses concern—shared and presented by law itself—that the 
legal process may not be able to do justice to, or in terms of, the 
 
 41. See FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 71 (1942) 
(“The principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy.”). 
 42. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 41.  
 43. SIMON, HOMICIDE, supra note 39, at 206.  
 44. To “live in Modern America,” as Michael Seidman notes, “is to be surrounded by 
noise.” SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 205; cf. SUSAN CAIN, QUIET: THE POWER OF INTROVERTS 
IN A WORLD THAT CAN’T STOP TALKING 4 (2012) (“Introversion—along with its cousins 
sensitivity, seriousness, and shyness—is now a second-class personality trait, somewhere 
between a disappointment and a pathology. . . . Extroversion is an enormously appealing 
personality style, but we’ve turned it into an oppressive standard to which most of us feel we 
must conform.”).  
 45. Steven I. Friedland, Post-Miranda Silence in the Wired Era: Reconstructing Real Time 
Silence in the Face of Police Questioning, 80 MISS. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2011) (suggesting that, given 
the rapid increase in communication in the digital era, when “individualized, directed questions 
go unanswered” the suspect is intentionally avoiding participation). 
 46. See Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 209, 209 (2007) (“[T]he most compelling rationale for the privilege is that it 
serves as a distancing mechanism, allowing defendants to disassociate themselves from 
prosecutions.”); see also Dennis Kurzon, When Silence May Mean Power, 18 J. PRAGMATICS 92, 
93–94 (1992) (“[A]t times it is the silent person who uses his or her silence to gain control of the 
situation—to attain power.”). An intriguing example of silence as resistance comes from the 
Dutch dramatic film A Question of Silence. The three defendants portrayed—women who have 
in various ways felt unheard and unseen throughout their lives—are heard for the first time 
when they silently defy the psychiatrist assessing their sanity. She declares them sane despite the 
bizarre and brutal murder they had committed because she listens to the effortful, silent protest 
underlying their failure to cooperate with the examination. A QUESTION OF SILENCE (Sigma 
Film Productions, 1982); see also I’VE LOVED YOU SO LONG (UGC YM, 2008) (depicting a 
woman convicted of a serious crime who maintains silence throughout the investigation, the 
trial, and her years in prison).  
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accused’s own speech.”47 Michael Seidman also highlights the 
connection between silence and the authenticity and integrity of 
narrative. “Whereas speech ensnares us in a web of other people,” he 
writes, “silence demonstrates the ineradicable and exhilarating 
loneliness of pure choice.”48 The discernible content of silence lies 
primarily in this refusal to take part. Although difficult to maintain 
over time, silence should have more procedural force when it is 
attempted. The current law of interrogations, however, gives 
attempted silence no effect. 
Nor has legal theory accounted for the complicated co-
authorship of statements produced in the wake of attempted silence.49 
Silence in performance illustrates why preserving that space matters. 
It otherwise fills with sound from the audience. What creates 
interesting compositions in the arts leaves dangerous ambiguity in the 
criminal justice system. When law enforcement attributes substantive 
meaning to silence, that imputed meaning often misleads.50 Negative 
inferences flow from opting out of questioning, even though greeting 
law enforcement with silence or signs of anxiety may have nothing to 
do with consciousness of guilt. And when interrogators then add their 
own sounds to the silence and thus shape a statement to conform to 
expectations, even deeper inaccuracies can result. 
 
 47. Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 33, at 18, 36; see also MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES 150 (2005) 
(“The silence of an accused following a felicitous warning . . . must be taken as accepting the 
law’s acknowledgment that conditions during in-custody interrogation may not be conducive to 
speech.”). Kent Greenawalt also explored the obligations of the accused in his classic defense of 
the right to silence. R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 15, 34–43 (1981). 
 48. SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 16; see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (“[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great 
landmarks in man’s struggle to make himself civilized.”).  
 49. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 403 (quoting defendant Ted Bradford, who falsely 
confessed and later stated that he got the details “from the detectives” and “did not supply any 
information at all”) (citation omitted)). 
 50. For an intriguing example of silence misconstrued as assent outside the law 
enforcement context, see Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward’s account of their effort to get a 
confirmation of White House aide H. R. Haldeman’s role in Watergate. Bernstein called a 
Justice Department lawyer, asked about Haldeman’s role, and told him that they would run the 
story unless the lawyer hung up before Bernstein finished counting to ten. The lawyer stayed on 
the line, but apparently because he misunderstood; his silence was taken as a confirmation 
although his intention was to warn them against running the story. See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB 
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 178–94 (1974).  
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C. The Legal Meaning of Silence 
In contemporary criminal investigations, however, silence rarely 
succeeds in separating defendants’ own thoughts and plans from 
investigators’ intentions. Conversely, silence is often taken as 
incriminating speech. Law enforcement can accuse someone of a 
crime and then introduce silence in the face of that accusation as 
substantive evidence of guilt.51 Silence can also impeach a defendant’s 
excuse, explanation, or alibi at trial.52 Relatedly, silence in response to 
a statement by someone else can qualify as a defendant’s adoption of 
that statement for purposes of the exemption of a party’s own 
admissions from the hearsay prohibition.53 It is treated as evidence of 
the truth of the unrefuted accusation and admissible as such, so long 
as “it would have been natural, under the circumstances, to assert [or 
deny] the fact.”54 But the circumstances of both law enforcement 
encounters and criminal accusations upset the balance of natural 
conversation.55 Withdrawal when confronted with law enforcement 
questioning constitutes the most ordinary reaction. Choosing to stay 
silent, however, does not suffice to invoke a defendant’s right to have 
silence and end questioning.56 Thus, while silence has evidentiary 
worth, it cannot by itself assert a defendant’s rights.57 
 
 51. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013); see also United States v. Frazier, 408 
F.3d 1102, 1110–11 (8th Cir. 2005) (permitting an inference of guilt from pre-Miranda silence). 
 52. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (impeachment with pre-custody 
silence “follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the 
truthfinding function of the criminal trial”); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 
1985) (testimony that defendants “made no effort to explain their presence at [a location 
connected to drug smuggling] on the night of their arrest” was properly admitted because their 
silence came before any Miranda warnings); cf. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 
1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The non-reaction the government seeks to introduce as ‘demeanor’ 
evidence is not an action or a physical response, but a failure to speak.”). 
 53. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (“A statement . . . is not hearsay [if] . . . [t]he statement 
is offered against an opposing party and[] is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed 
to be true . . . .”); cf. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (“Statements against interest are regularly 
admitted into evidence at criminal trials, and there is no good reason to approach a defendant’s 
silence any differently.” (citation omitted)). 
 54. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) 
advisory committee’s note (“When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would, 
under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue.”). 
 55. See generally Deborah Tannen, Silence: Anything But, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 93 
(Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike eds., 1985) (explaining the role and meaning of 
silence in conversation).  
 56. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383–84 (2010). 
 57. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 (“A suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put 
police on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege.”). 
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This is so because, contrary to the popular gloss on “taking the 
Fifth,” no robust right to be silent or to impose silence on law 
enforcement actually exists. The Fifth Amendment provides 
protection only against compelled, testimonial self-incrimination.58 
Disregard for the procedural significance of silent refusal has a long 
provenance. According to Albert Alschuler, for example, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege “in its inception was not intended to afford 
criminal defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating 
questions.”59 Instead, “as embodied in the United States 
Constitution,” its goal was simply to prohibit “improper methods of 
interrogation.”60 One must affirmatively assert the right to stay silent, 
while under threat of judicially imposed punishment, before the right 
even attaches. 
Until the 1966 Miranda decision, the “improper” questioning 
addressed by the Fifth Amendment did not generally contemplate 
extrajudicial interrogations like encounters with the police.61 The 
Court’s earlier oversight of police questioning references the Due 
Process Clause,62 using a “totality of the circumstances” inquiry to 
evaluate whether a given interrogation technique overbore a suspect’s 
will.63 The nature of law enforcement’s threats and promises, the 
conditions of the questioning, and the suspect’s particular 
vulnerabilities are among the relevant circumstances.64 That 
subjective test has proven unpredictable,65 and the Miranda Court 
 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “no person shall . . . be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”). 
 59. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2638 (1995). 
 60. Id. at 2631. 
 61. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–61 (1966). But cf. Bram v. United States, 168 
U.S. 532, 563–65 (1897) (applying the privilege against self-incrimination to exclude an 
involuntary extrajudicial confession). 
 62. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). 
 63. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a 
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of the 
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation.”); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). 
 64. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 281–84. 
 65. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 568–637 (1961) (including an exegesis on the 
meaning of voluntariness (complete with 97 footnotes) that garnered only two votes); see also, 
e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (1981) 
(stating that the pre-Miranda test was a “subtle mixture of factual and legal elements” that 
“virtually invited” judges to “give weight to their subjective preferences”).  
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substituted a set of bright-line requirements in the form of warnings 
to suspects.66 
The Miranda decision concluded that the privilege against self-
incrimination is “fully applicable during a period of custodial 
interrogation” and required specific safeguards for the privilege in 
that setting.67 But those safeguards are not additional protections so 
much as a hedge against the implications of the holding. Miranda 
established that all situations of custodial interrogation are, by 
definition, compulsion,68 and the constitutional privilege is violated 
whenever there is compelled testimonial self-incrimination. As a 
result, all incriminating statements obtained through custodial 
interrogations were theoretically subject to exclusion. In other words, 
Miranda stands for a proposition it does not state. It does not grant a 
“right to remain silent” per se. Rather, it sets forth a procedure for 
permitting custodial interrogation despite the right to be free from 
compelled testimonial self-incrimination.69 
The Court’s establishment of the well-known warnings that 
suspects receive—and its pronouncement that those warnings would 
be sufficient to mitigate the inherent compulsion of interrogations—
allowed the continued use of investigative interviews.70 A person in 
custody and subject to questioning “must first be informed in clear 
and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.”71 That 
warning must also “be accompanied by the explanation that anything 
said can and will be used against the individual in court.”72 And the 
suspect must be further “informed that he has the right to consult 
 
 66. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492; see Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 628 (1996) (noting that the Miranda rule was intended to 
displace “the subjective, case-by-case due process voluntariness approach with an objective 
standard that applied equally to all cases”).  
 67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. 
 68. See id. at 444, 457–58; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 435, 447 (1987) (interpreting Miranda to hold that even “the briefest period of 
interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion”). 
 69. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 561 (1996) (“[T]he Warren Court . . . 
explicitly structured Miranda’s warning and waiver requirements to ensure that confessions 
could continue to be elicited and used.”).  
 70. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1616 n.47 
(2009) (“[O]nce suspects have received and waived their Fifth Amendment rights, courts give 
interrogators a lot of leeway on the theory that the warnings educate and fortify suspects for the 
interrogation ordeal.”). 
 71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 
 72. Id. at 469. 
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with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation,” 
and that “if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent 
him.”73 Given those warnings, a suspect, in theory, no longer 
experiences compulsion, and subsequent statements are admissible. 
Many police interrogations, however, occur prior to formal custody 
and therefore in the absence of any warnings at all.74 
Moreover, even though the Fifth Amendment privilege now 
extends beyond the courtroom to the stationhouse, silence in the 
courtroom receives substantially more protection than silence in 
interrogations.75 In Griffin v. California,76 the Supreme Court 
established that prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s 
silence at trial, as that argument raises the cost of asserting the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.77 Conversely, defendants cannot escape 
comments equating silence with guilt when the silence occurred in 
conversation with law enforcement. A defendant’s post-arrest silence, 
after receiving Miranda warnings, is sufficiently “ambiguous” to 
preclude admission.78 Pre-Miranda silence, however, even when a 
defendant is under arrest, still constitutes impeachment material.79 
The law thus treats silent responses during noncustodial 
questioning as substantively unambiguous. Pre-arrest silence signifies 
a telling failure to deny or consciousness of wrongdoing. On the other 
hand, silence is procedurally ambivalent throughout investigative 
encounters. Rather than serving as a clear refusal to engage or an 
effective invocation of rights, at best it delays questioning and 
“confession.” Of course, silence can preface a truthful and accurate 
statement, but its breach often leads to the unreliable government-
created evidence as well. Interrogation practices on the ground, 
 
 73. Id. at 471, 473. 
 74. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1544 (2008) 
(noting police training materials that “tell[] officers that they may use the full toolkit of 
interrogation tactics . . . to question a non-custodial suspect at the stationhouse”).  
 75. Compare Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (holding that the state’s use of 
pre-arrest silence for impeachment does not unduly burden the Fifth Amendment right), with 
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328–29 (1999) (concluding that no negative inferences 
may be drawn from the failure to testify at the sentencing phase), Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967) (identifying reversible error where the prosecution repeatedly commented 
on defendant’s failure to testify), and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment forbids remarks by either judge or prosecutor on defendant’s failure 
to testify at trial). 
 76. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 77. See id. at 613–15. 
 78. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). 
 79. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982). 
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however, take no account of the connection between silence and the 
integrity of the investigation. 
1. Substantive Silence.  The Supreme Court’s most recent 
decision concerning police interviews that occur prior to arrest 
further encroaches on the protection that silence can provide by way 
of separation. According to the reasoning in Salinas v. Texas,80 silence 
constitutes a substantive admission of guilt if maintained in a 
noncustodial setting.81 And even stationhouse interviews that are 
functionally official can be labeled noncustodial if they lack the 
formal indicia of arrests.82 In Salinas, the defendant Genovevo Salinas 
voluntarily went to a Houston police station to answer questions 
about the 1992 murder of two brothers.83 As he was not in custody 
during questioning, the case did not implicate Miranda but instead 
addressed the broader evidentiary significance and admissibility of 
pre-arrest silence under the Fifth Amendment. Over the course of an 
hour, Salinas answered all of the officers’ questions save one. When 
asked if the shotgun casings found at the scene of the crime would 
match a shotgun retrieved from the home he shared with his parents, 
Salinas exhibited nervous behavior—reportedly looking down at the 
floor, shuffling his feet, biting his lip, clenching his hands, and 
“tighten[ing] up”84—but he gave no verbal response. After he stayed 
 
 80. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013). 
 81. Id. at 2178. Prior to the 2013 Salinas decision, the lower courts had diverged on the use 
of a defendant’s silence, as both substantive evidence and impeachment, when the silence 
occurred pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. See United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 604 
(5th Cir. 2011) (documenting the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ difference with the First, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth). Compare United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 677–78 (4th Cir. 
2004) (holding that both implicit and explicit advice to the defendant to remain silent precludes 
the use of silence against the defendant at trial, but only post-arrest); United States v. Oplinger, 
150 F.3d 1061, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135 
(9th Cir. 2010) (using pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 & n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(custody does not preclude comment on silence in response to questioning if Miranda warnings 
have not been given), with Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 2000) (use of pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence violates constitutional rights); United States v. 
Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 1991) (plain error to admit silence in response to 
allegations); and United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(defendant has the constitutional right to say nothing in response to allegations, and this right to 
silence does not exist solely in the context of Miranda warnings). 
 82. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 89 (5th ed. 2011) (advising the use of formal 
interrogations that remain technically extra-custodial to avoid giving Miranda warnings). 
 83. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 84. Id. 
GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2015  1:38 AM 
2016] SILENCE 713 
silent for a few moments, police changed the subject, and Salinas 
continued answering questions.85 He was arrested immediately after 
questioning on outstanding traffic warrants but subsequently released 
because prosecutors did not believe they had sufficient evidence to 
charge him.86 Salinas was later indicted for murder, convicted, and 
sentenced to twenty years in prison.87 At trial, prosecutors cited his 
failure to respond to the ballistics question as evidence of his guilt. In 
closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that an innocent person 
asked about the shotgun shells would have said, “What are you 
talking about? I didn’t do that. I wasn’t there.”88 
The Court ruled 5-4 that this inference from Salinas’s silence was 
a permissible argument because the Fifth Amendment privilege is not 
“self-executing.”89 Justice Alito’s opinion for the plurality of the 
Court concluded that Salinas failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
right, and that invocation is required except when a criminal 
defendant has declined to take the stand at trial, or where there is 
government coercion rendering a statement involuntary.90 Because 
Salinas was neither a nontestifying defendant protected by Griffin nor 
a suspect subjected to the inherently coercive environment of 
custodial interrogation, the silent response received no protection. To 
escape the evidentiary significance of pausing and remaining silent 
during questioning, the Court held that suspects—in some affirmative 
terms not specified in the opinion—must assert their rights.91 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Petition for A Writ of 
Certiorari at 5, Salinas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (No. 12-246) (quoting the trial record).  
 89. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 485 U.S. 420, 425 (1984)).  
 90. Id. at 2179–80. Justice Alito’s opinion announcing the decision was joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring only 
in the judgment.  
 91. Id. at 2182. Justice Thomas, writing for himself and Justice Scalia, argued that whether 
or not Salinas had invoked the Fifth Amendment, his silence would still constitute admissible 
evidence against him because the prosecutor’s comments did nothing to compel him within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Mitchell v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he threat of an adverse 
inference does not ‘compel’ anyone to testify. . . . [I]in most instances, a guilty defendant would 
choose to remain silent despite the adverse inference, on the theory that it would do him less 
damage than his cross-examined testimony.”)). Indeed, Justice Thomas indicated that he would 
overrule the 1965 Griffin decision and permit prosecutors to comment on defendants’ silence. 
See id.  
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A more nuanced understanding of the expressive function of 
silence emerges from Justice Breyer’s dissent. Commenting on silence 
does, in the dissent’s view, compel a defendant to testify against 
himself.92 As the Miranda Court concluded, no use should be made at 
trial of “the fact that [the defendant] stood mute or claimed his 
privilege in the face of accusation.”93 Even in precustodial encounters, 
because silence can communicate implied assertions of fact or belief, 
it can also be “testimonial” within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.94 Moreover, invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege should be recognized, according to the dissent, even absent 
specific words or direct assertions.95 The relevant question is whether 
one can “fairly infer from an individual’s silence and surrounding 
circumstances an exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.”96 The 
majority’s reasoning in Salinas, however, precludes consideration of 
silence for the one thing it seems well suited to communicate, which is 
a suspect’s reluctance to engage.97 Instead, the decision supports the 
use of silence as a confession, despite the substantive ambiguity of 
silence, and the opening that it leaves for participation and 
interpretation by the government.98 
2. Procedural Silence.  Even in cases that clearly animate 
Miranda’s protections, the Court has interpreted silence to the 
government’s advantage. Not speaking to assert Fifth Amendment 
rights can be enough to establish waiver. Take the defendant in 
Berghuis v. Thompkins,99 a shooting suspect who sat in a straight-
backed chair for almost three hours, making few audible noises, and 
 
 92. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). 
 94. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 
U.S. 582, 596–97 (1990)).  
 95. Id. (“[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.” (quoting 
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955))). 
 96. Id. at 2191 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97. The Second Circuit recently addressed a question left open in Salinas: whether the 
government can introduce in its case in chief the mere fact that a defendant invoked the 
privilege against self-incrimination during questioning. See United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2013). In Okatan, the court concluded that allowing prosecutors to comment on the 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment would penalize the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional 
right. Id. at 121.  
 98. For a discussion of the interpretive potential of silence, see supra notes 10–31 and 
accompanying text.  
 99. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
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refusing to respond to law enforcement’s questions.100 Throughout a 
lengthy accusatory monologue by police, Thompkins sustained near-
total silence—punctuated only by a few nods of his head, a moment 
when he rejected the offer of a peppermint, and a comment that his 
chair was uncomfortably hard.101 Though Thompkins received his 
Miranda warnings and acknowledged that he understood them, he 
declined to sign the written waiver of his rights.102 At the end of this 
interrogation, a detective asked if Thompkins believed in God, and he 
responded audibly with one word: “Yes.” Thompkins was then asked 
if he prayed to God, and he again answered “yes.” And finally, the 
detective said, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that 
boy down?” Thompkins once more said “yes,” but thereafter refused 
to make a written confession.103 The Michigan trial court admitted his 
three “yes” responses into evidence, and Thompkins was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.104 
When the case reached the Sixth Circuit on habeas review, the 
court held that Thompkins’ “persistent silence for nearly three hours 
in response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of 
the story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers: 
Thompkins did not wish to waive his rights.”105 The Supreme Court 
reversed, in another 5-4 decision, reasoning that the silence itself was 
insignificant because the “yes” responses were uncoerced and 
established “an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”106 The 
Court further concluded that allowing silence itself to serve as an 
invocation of the right to be silent would complicate law 
enforcement’s ability to determine a suspect’s intent.107 Thus the 
ambiguity of silence operates only in law enforcement’s favor. That 
analysis marks a clear departure from the Miranda decision itself, 
 
 100. Id. at 374–76.  
 101. Id. at 375–76.  
 102. Id. at 375.  
 103. Id. at 376.  
 104. Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-CV-70188-DT, 2006 WL 2811303, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 28, 2006); see Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 378. 
 105. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. at 384, 388–89.  
 107. Id. at 382; see also Green v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 835, 839 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) 
(deciding that suspect who told police to “buckle up for the long ride,” turned his chair away, 
closed his eyes, and sat silently for two hours was not invoking the right to silence). 
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which stated that neither silence nor a subsequent confession could 
amount to a valid waiver.108 
For suspects, it has grown increasingly difficult to assert and 
maintain the right to stay silent. Only by verbally and explicitly 
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege can one silence questions. 
Once the privilege is successfully invoked, interrogators in theory will 
“scrupulously honor[]” it by ceasing questioning, and will resume 
engagement only after time has passed and new warnings have been 
issued.109 If a specific request for the assistance of an attorney has 
been made, questioning must stop altogether and cannot continue 
without counsel present, unless the defendant reinitiates the interview 
and waives her rights.110 That request for legal assistance, however, 
must be not only specific but also sustained. The defendant in Davis 
v. United States,111 for example, endured an hour and a half of 
questioning in silence, and then said, “Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer.”112 The Court found that statement too equivocal to constitute 
a request for counsel.113 
The high standards for invoking the right to stop questioning 
produce many failed attempts at silence. Invocation must be 
unmistakable,114 and it must be out loud. Any ambivalence allows 
questioning to continue over time, and silence is always construed as 
ambivalent. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her Berghuis dissent, “[A] 
suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent against such a 
finding of ‘waiver’ must, counterintuitively, speak—and must do so 
with sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that 
construes ambiguity in favor of the police.”115 Her opinion catalogues 
a variety of direct statements deemed too ambiguous to constitute 
invocation—including “I’m not going to talk about nothin[g]”; “I just 
don’t think that I should say anything”; “I don’t even want to, you 
 
 108. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (stating that demonstrating 
waiver places a “heavy burden” on the government and rejecting the possibility of waiver on a 
“silent record”), with Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 383 (“The course of decisions since Miranda . . . 
demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements . . . .”).  
 109. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
 110. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478–87 (1981); see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 
U.S. 1039, 1044–45 (1983) (noting that an inquiry into whether a waiver is valid includes 
determining whether the accused reopened dialogue with authorities).  
 111. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 112. Id. at 455.  
 113. Id. at 459–62. 
 114. See id. at 459 (requiring that the request for counsel be unambiguous). 
 115. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 391 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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know what I’m saying, discuss no more about it”; “I wish to not say 
any more”; and “I’d like to be done with this.”116 It is no wonder that 
so few defendants can successfully invoke the right to silence when it 
is insufficient simply to state “I got nothin[g] more to say to you. I’m 
done. This is over.”117 
It is true that a suspect can, technically, neither waive nor invoke, 
and instead remain completely silent and wait out law enforcement’s 
tactics. But precedents like Berghuis encourage law enforcement “to 
question a suspect at length—notwithstanding his persistent refusal to 
answer questions—in the hope of eventually obtaining a single 
inculpatory response which will suffice to prove waiver of rights.”118 
The boundary that silence seeks to create is simply unsustainable in 
the face of prolonged interrogation. 
As a result, attempted silence rarely serves any purpose helpful 
to the defendant. The negative space around it gets interpreted as 
assent, but it does not succeed as a positive assertion of rights or as an 
objection. And the real danger of encroaching on silence arises once 
these permissive rules encourage its breach and defendants do begin 
to speak. 
3. Broken Silence and the Problem of Co-Authorship.  When the 
significance of silence as an assertion goes unnoticed, and 
interrogators succeed in breaking silence, the resulting statements are 
only partly of a suspect’s own making. Manipulating a subject into 
compliance often means that a confession contains intentional or 
unintentional distortions as well. The datasets recently generated by 
Innocence Projects reveal the leading role that false confessions play 
in wrongful convictions and a high incidence of government-created 
evidence within those false confessions.119 Brandon Garrett’s 
landmark study identifies forty false confessions to rape or murder 
among the first 250 cases involving DNA exonerations.120 Ninety-
 
 116. Id. at 411 n.9 (quoting United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th Cir. 2000); State v. Jackson, 839 N.E.2d 362, 373 
(Ohio 2006); State v. Deen, 953 So. 2d 1057, 1058–60 (La. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 117. State v. Saeger, No. 2009AP2133–CR, 2010 WL 3155264, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 
2010) (alteration in original).  
 118. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 404 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 119. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 16, at 18–19; SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 121 
(concluding that the existence of false confessions is “indisputable” given exonerations based on 
DNA evidence). 
 120. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051 
(2010). More than half of those false confessions were associated with dispositional 
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seven percent of those statements included specific, nonpublic details 
about how the crime occurred.121 For example, defendant Jeffrey 
Deskovic, whose story Garrett recounts, drew accurate diagrams of 
three different crime scenes of which he had no actual knowledge. He 
was convicted and served sixteen years in prison before he was 
exonerated.122 
Many criminal justice scholars have turned their attention to the 
puzzling mechanisms of contaminated confessions,123 but the 
relationship between a suspect’s initial silence and those statements is 
not well understood. Silence may constitute the only accurate 
contribution that a suspect can offer, and the statement least likely to 
deceive.124 Yet investigators often undervalue it, and may even find it 
discomfiting. Forbearance in an interrogation can appear 
confrontational when law enforcement assumes guilty knowledge on 
the part of the suspect.125 Police want to assert their authority,126 
enhance the efficiency of the investigation, and extract information 
they view as essential to solving the crime.127 
Moreover, confessional speech, in Western culture, has a “prime 
mark of authenticity” and is “par excellence the kind of speech in 
 
characteristics such as youth, disability, or mental illness, id. at 1064, but many of them involved 
transmission of non-public facts to the defendant by law enforcement, id. at 1057. This 
contamination problem now appears “epidemic, not episodic” when it comes to false 
confessions. Laura H. Nirider, Joshua A. Tepfer & Steven A. Drizin, Combating Contamination 
in Confession Cases, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 846–49 (2012). 
 121. Garrett, supra note 120, at 1054.  
 122. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 15–17.  
 123. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in 
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 208 (Tom 
Williamson ed., 2006); Sara C. Appleby, Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, Police-Induced 
Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Their Content and Impact, 19 PSYCH. CRIME & L. 111, 
111 (2011).  
 124. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law & Literature, 8 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 27 (1996) (“[T]he speech act of confession is a dubious guide to the 
truth, which must rather be sought in the resistance to such speech.”).  
 125. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Why Interrogation Contamination Occurs, 11 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 193, 197 (2013) (describing the American method of interrogation as “guilt-
presumptive,” “accusatory,” and driven by “adversarial assumptions”). 
 126. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 1435, 1446 (2009) (discussing the state’s motivation to charge “insubordinate individuals . . . 
solely because their acts constitute an affront to the formal dignity or authority of the state”).  
 127. Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (linking the express invocation 
requirement to the government’s “right” to testimony); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 
443 (1972) (noting the “general common-law principle that ‘the public has a right to every man’s 
evidence,’” in the context of the government’s power to compel testimony by granting immunity 
(footnote omitted)). 
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which the individual authenticates his inner truth.”128 Both 
investigators and fact-finders highly prize confessions because they 
appear to address the intractable intersubjectivity problem: an 
individual’s own statement seems the best proof of her state of 
mind.129 In many cases, what “really happened” is not otherwise 
accessible to investigators, and the prospects for identifying any 
actionable offense turn on overcoming a suspect’s silence.130 
It is true, of course, that most suspects talk, and some of them 
make the affirmative choice (albeit an ill-considered one) to do so. 
More than 80 percent of suspects waive their right to silence once 
advised of it, and the majority of interrogations yield some form of 
incriminating statement.131 Factually innocent suspects often waive 
because they believe they have nothing to fear, while guilty ones 
often conclude that waiver will make them appear less culpable.132 
“[W]ith the right combination of alibi and excuse,”133 they imagine 
they will parry questions successfully. 
Another set of suspects makes a meaningful attempt at silence 
and still fails.134 The focus here is on this group because the statements 
 
 128. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 4. 
 129. Louis Michael Seidman, Some Stories About Confessions and Confessions About 
Stories, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 162, 164 (Peter Brooks & 
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[P]eople who confess offer a window into their true self.”); cf. 
BROOKS, supra note 33, at 140 (“In a contemporary American culture characterized by 
confessional discourse and multifarious therapeutic practice, a high value has come to be placed 
on speaking confessionally . . . .”).  
 130. See Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1609 (“[The felt] need for confessions” arises from 
“those crimes whose sole promise of solution rests on the interrogation and nothing but the 
interrogation [where] the interrogation story is what happened because it provides all and the 
only meaning we have.”); see also CONSTABLE, supra note 47, at 164–65 (discussing the way in 
which confessions are both constative and performative). 
 131. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
260, 280 (1996) (reporting that 64 percent of interrogations yield incriminating statements, even 
after adequate Miranda warnings and waivers).  
 132. See Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their “Miranda” Rights: 
The Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 217–18 (2004) (describing the results of 
an experiment where 36 percent of guilty suspects “waived their rights . . . so that the detective 
would not infer guilt from a lack of compliance” and 72 percent of innocent suspects who 
“waived their rights said they did so . . . because they were innocent and had nothing to fear”). 
As Peter Reilly, wrongfully convicted of murder after a false confession, explained, “‘My state 
of mind was that I hadn’t done anything wrong and I felt that only a criminal really needed an 
attorney, and this was all going to come out in the wash.’” Id. at 218 (citation omitted).  
 133. See SIMON, HOMICIDE, supra note 39, at 206. 
 134. Conversely, the criminal justice process imposes silence on defendants in the trial 
setting, where speaking might contribute the most useful information to fact-finders. There, as 
several commentators have noted, defendants are inhibited by the rules concerning 
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they ultimately give to investigators often include critical elements 
that the interrogators co-author. The resulting “government-created 
evidence” has in turn been revealed as a significant source of error 
that merits closer scrutiny.135 Some measure of participation from an 
interrogator is inevitable, and most confessions are jointly produced 
to an extent. Likewise, cross-examination in court can yield useful 
and accurate testimony, even though it consists almost entirely of 
statements by the examining lawyer. Even confessions that do 
contribute to truth-seeking emerge through questioning and thus 
include language generated by the government. As Anne Coughlin 
writes, “shapely confessions”—statements that will advance the 
government’s case in court, or strengthen its hand at plea 
bargaining—“rarely, if ever, spring full-blown from the mouths of 
criminal suspects.”136 
Though all evidence “comes” from the government in the sense 
that the government gathers it in the investigative process and 
presents it in order to meet the burden of proof,137 evidence that is 
heavily influenced by the government yet purports to be from some 
independent source can cause error. That flaw seems to emerge more 
frequently when a suspect first chooses not to talk but then submits 
after a prolonged silence. Although 90 percent of all interrogations 
last no more than two hours,138 90 percent of the exonerees in 
Brandon Garrett’s dataset of wrongful convictions endured 
interrogations that went on for more than three hours, and in some 
 
impeachment, even though their testimony might have high value. See Barbara Allen Babcock, 
Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (advocating for broader 
protections for defendants who choose to take the stand in order to introduce their own stories 
into the trial); Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules 
That Encourage Defendants To Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 897 (2008) (arguing that the 
current legal framework with disincentives to defendant testimony “cavalierly squanders a rich 
testimonial resource [the defendant] at great cost to the search for truth and with little benefit”); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 
1451 (2005) (identifying “systemic implications for the integrity of the justice process” that stem 
from defendant silence).  
 135. Garrett, supra note 8, at 408 (noting that “[c]onfession contamination is 
overwhelmingly prevalent in false confessions among persons exonerated by DNA tests”). 
 136. Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1602. 
 137. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) (“[E]ven the guilty 
are not to be convicted unless the prosecution ‘shoulder[s] the entire load.’”); see also, e.g., 
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (citing “the long tradition and vital principle 
that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the Government, not on inquisitions 
conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power”). 
 138. Leo, supra note 131, at 279. 
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cases took place over days.139 In protracted encounters, law 
enforcement “maintains control of the storytelling, so that the suspect 
is put in a position of denying or affirming—often, affirming through 
denials that lead to entrapment—the unfolding narrative that . . . is 
largely of the interrogator’s own making.”140 
Despite the assumption that the evidence in the accused’s own 
words always represents “the most reliable evidence we can have,”141 
contaminated confessions contain few salient facts that are actually 
the accused’s own statements. The extent to which interrogators 
participate in the construction of statements requires some 
calibration, and what happened when attempted silence failed is often 
quite telling with regard to the degree of government participation. 
The moment when silence is breached contains information not only 
about whether involuntary testimony was elicited from a defendant’s 
“own mouth,”142 but also about whether the government put words in 
the defendant’s mouth. Recent assessments of unconfronted hearsay 
statements,143 suggestive eyewitness identifications,144 and statements 
of jailhouse informants145 underscore this problem of government-
created evidence. But false confessions may best illustrate the 
 
 139. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 38; see also Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the 
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 105, 
145 (1997) (“[M]ore than five hours of continuous interrogation may create a substantial risk 
that the suspect will acquiesce to police suggestions . . . .”).  
 140. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 40; see also Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1608–09 (describing 
the interrogator as “not merely finding but creating, not merely reconstructing but constructing, 
the solution to the crime”).  
 141. BROOKS, supra note 33, at 15; see also id. (suggesting that the perceived reliability of 
confessions allows that “[w]hen someone confesses, his judges may proceed to condemn him 
with a good conscience”). 
 142. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[O]ur accusatory system of criminal 
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of 
compelling it from his own mouth.”); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (stating that 
“society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth” 
but “by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation”). 
 143. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) (emphasizing that “even if the 
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, 
and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class”). 
 144. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2012) (“A primary aim of excluding 
identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law 
enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first place.”). 
 145. See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 124 (describing how informants’ statements in cases of 
wrongful convictions often appeared “made to order” and included “details designed to 
undermine the defendant’s alibi, address weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, or enhance 
prosecution evidence”). 
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investigative interstices where government agents can knowingly or 
unknowingly manipulate inputs.146 
Although interrogation regulation has been slow to change, the 
social science research demonstrating that “innocent individuals are 
surprisingly easily seduced to falsely confess a crime” has 
proliferated.147 Researchers have demonstrated that subjects will not 
only succumb to the pressures of interrogation but will then 
internalize false memories of committing a crime. In a recent study, 
70 percent of a group of Canadian undergraduate students reported 
episodic memories of committing crimes after exposure to 
misinformation in a controlled experimental setting.148 Interrogation 
techniques can thus put words not only in suspects’ mouths but in 
their memories. In a realm where complicating the very idea of 
authorship is part of the point, confounding the identity of the 
“performers” in 4’33” expands the meaning of the piece. 4’33” is “full 
of sound,” Cage explained, that he “did not think of beforehand,” but 
heard “for the first time the same time others hear[d].”149 But blurring 
those lines is not desirable when law enforcement participates in 
creating evidence, and that evidence is then central to a finding of 
criminal liability. 
II.  THE NEW ACCURACY IMPERATIVE 
Government-created evidence requires close scrutiny, but this 
sort of attention to substantive reliability has been labeled the 
 
 146. Id. at 8–9 (identifying false confessions and tainted eyewitness identifications as 
prominent causes of wrongful convictions); see also Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. 
Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989 
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543 (2005). 
 147. Eric Rassin & Han Israëls, False Confession in the Lab: A Review, 7 ERASMUS L. REV. 
219, 222 (2014). 
 148. Julia Shaw & Stephen Porter, Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime, 
26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 291, 296 (2015). 
 149. Letter from John Cage to Helen Wolff (1954), in 4’33”: JOHN CAGE CENTENNIAL 
EDITION, supra note 10, at 35. Cage wrote that the piece was never actually silent: 
What we hear is determined by our own emptiness, our own receptivity; we receive to 
the extent we are empty to do so. If one is full or in the course of its performance 
becomes full of an idea, for example, that this piece is a trick for shock and 
bewilderment then it is just that. 
Id.; see also Kania, supra note 12, at 347 (concluding that even a member of the audience yelling 
“This is rubbish!” and storming out of the theater would plausibly count as part of the 4’33” 
performance).  
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“largely forgotten purpose of the rules.”150 That is particularly the case 
when epistemic competence conflicts with other goals of criminal 
procedure.151 According to William Stuntz, Warren Court criminal 
procedure often detracted from substantive accuracy.152 The 
bureaucratic imperatives of the criminal justice system can further 
“sideline[] the accuracy of its somber endeavor in favor of a slew of 
other goals, interests, and constraints.”153 The Court, of course, has at 
times emphasized the “truth-seeking function of the trial process”154 
and has noted the “general goal of establishing ‘procedures under 
which criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of 
all the evidence which exposes the truth.’”155 And in other contexts—
including the due process right to material exculpatory information 
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—the Court continues to 
cite verdict accuracy as an important goal.156 
Accuracy has rarely figured, however, in contemporary 
discussions of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. In nineteenth century cases extending the privilege 
from the courtroom to investigative confessions, the Court did cite 
reliability concerns alongside autonomy rationales.157 Coercive 
 
 150. Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall & Amy Vatner, 
Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First 
Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486.  
 151. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth & Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 289–90 (2013) 
(stating that the goals of trial are more complex than “finding facts”); see also, e.g., Darryl K. 
Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 211 (2014) 
(“Constitutional rights to introduce evidence and confront state witnesses serve political norms 
that value individual autonomy and process participation, independent of whether they improve 
accuracy in trial judgments.”).  
 152. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 818–19 (2006). 
 153. Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 421, 
440 (2014). 
 154. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  
 155. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
900–901 (1984)). 
 156. See, e.g., id. (stating that Brady standards are driven by the “general goal of establishing 
procedures under which criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding 
that effective counsel fulfills the “duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render 
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) 
(noting that the presence of defense counsel tests the government’s case and thereby can 
produce a more accurate result). 
 157. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541–44 (1897); cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278, 285–87 (1936) (recognizing the fundamental unfairness of using an untrustworthy 
confession). 
GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2015  1:38 AM 
724 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:697 
interrogation techniques were expressly disfavored because they 
overrode the presumption that “one who is innocent will not imperil 
his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.”158 But the 
1966 Miranda decision itself makes only passing mention of 
accuracy,159 and few subsequent cases discuss it at all.160 In Colorado v. 
Connelly,161 the Court flatly stated that reliability is solely the 
province of evidence law.162 The purpose of the voluntariness 
requirement, according to the Court’s reasoning, is to “prevent 
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or 
false.”163 
Yet concern with the reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 
is on the rise in criminal procedure scholarship. As Daniel Medwed 
explains, both advocacy and commentary on criminal law have turned 
to “innocentrism,” and factual integrity is newly central.164 There is 
both heightened awareness of error in investigations and trials and 
greater understanding that the (often unwitting) participation of 
police and prosecutors in the creation of evidence can lead to 
incorrect results.165 Greater attention to the significance and status of 
silence would correspond with this renewed focus on the quality of 
evidence and the accuracy of verdicts. 
 
 158. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). 
 159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (1966). 
 160. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of this 
Court’s decision in Miranda” is to safeguard the right to “choose between speech and silence.” 
(emphasis omitted)). But see Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (stating that 
Miranda can protect against unreliable statements). 
 161. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 162. Id. at 167 (“A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be 
proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the 
forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 163. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). But see 
Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s 
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 742 (1963) (“[W]hatever the 
current meaning of the elusive terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ confessions, originally the 
terminology was a substitute for the ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘reliability’ test.”). 
 164. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1558–64. 
 165. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction 
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 37 (“Over the past decade, DNA technology challenged the Court’s 
assumption of guilt with the postconviction exoneration of mounting numbers of innocent 
people.”). 
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A. Wrongful Convictions 
Reclaiming the instrumental rationale for protecting silence finds 
its primary support in recent empirical developments. DNA testing 
has established the existence of “known innocents” in the criminal 
justice process, in significant numbers, and it suggests a wider 
population of unidentified innocents.166 Innocence Projects are a 
relatively new phenomenon, but the exonerations of the past twenty 
years have begun to shift paradigms in criminal procedure. The 
empirical data has given rise to a new accuracy imperative.167 
Wrongful convictions were once more theoretical than real. They 
were debated in academic terms about the validity of Blackstone’s 
ratio: “[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent 
suffer.”168 But error in criminal adjudication is no longer a theoretical 
issue, and the wrongfully convicted defendant is more than a “ghost” 
that haunts the criminal justice process like an “unreal dream.”169 The 
debate about wrongful convictions has largely moved past skepticism 
about their occurrence. 
Furthermore, as popular accounts of the incidence, causes, and 
impact of wrongful convictions have proliferated,170 they have also 
 
 166. See Gross et al., supra note 146, at 531 (“Beneath the surface there are other 
undetected miscarriages of justice in rape cases without testable DNA, and a much larger group 
of undetected false convictions in robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA 
identification is useless.”); see also Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and 
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 937–40 (2008) (detailing the problem of exonerations as a “small 
and unrepresentative sample of all false convictions”); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents 
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779–80 (2007) (calculating the rate of wrongful convictions in capital rape-
murder cases in the 1980s to be 3.3–5%); Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: 
We Can’t, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/us/25bar.html [http://
perma.cc/D2J2-8HYJ] (explaining that, outside of the context of a small sample of murder and 
rape cases, “we know almost nothing about the number of innocent people in prison”). But see 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (extrapolating from editorial 
and empirical challenges to the existence of wrongful convictions to conclude that the error rate 
is actually 0.027 percent). 
 167. See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 134, 146–47 
(2008) (discussing the “Reliability Model” based on best practices that emerges from the 
“Innocence Movement.”). 
 168. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man go free.”); Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1997). 
 169. United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Judge Learned Hand).  
 170. See, e.g., MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL 
WASHINGTON, JR. (2003); JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN 
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raised broader awareness of the potential for error. Indeed, the 
“attention paid to actual innocence by litigators, academics, 
legislators, authors, and even television executives signals a new era 
in which fact-based arguments surrounding guilt or innocence may 
begin to trump or at least hold their own with the traditional rights-
based arguments that have been the norm in criminal law for 
generations.”171 With that raised awareness comes an imperative to 
consider best practices with regard to the reliability of investigative 
techniques, including interrogations. 
B. Silence and Innocence 
Now that “constitutional error no longer appears as a procedural 
technicality asserted by a probably guilty [defendant],”172 the 
heightened prospect of innocence requires new thinking about silence 
as well. Hundreds of demonstrably false confessions have contributed 
to wrongful convictions, and various studies document cases in which 
silence could have protected factual innocence.173 Whether an 
 
A SMALL TOWN (2006); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO 
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012); DAVID PROTESS & ROB WARDEN, A 
PROMISE OF JUSTICE: THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR FIGHT TO SAVE FOUR INNOCENT MEN (1998); 
BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JAMES DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); JENNIFER 
THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF 
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009); TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: 
MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).  
 171. Medwed, supra note 164, at 1551; see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: 
Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786 
(2014) (“The magnitude of our criminal justice system’s accuracy problem is widely debated, but 
the notion that it is nontrivial and that greater attention to pretrial activities is an important part 
of the solution is widely accepted.”). The enormous success of the “Serial” podcast—which 
attracted millions of listeners and raised awareness about potential inaccuracies—exemplifies 
the emerging concern with reliability. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, Serial’s Second Act, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/serials-second-
act/385287 [http://perma.cc/7LT6-WBC7]. 
 172. Garrett, supra note 165, at 38; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 71 (1997) (“[E]ven an innocent person may say 
seemingly inculpatory things under pressure and suspicion and when flustered by trained 
inquisitors.”); GARRETT, supra note 16, at 18 (“While we do not know how often false 
confessions occur, there is a new awareness among scholars, legislators, judges, prosecutors, 
police departments, and the public that innocent people can falsely confess, often due to 
psychological pressure placed upon them during police interrogations.”). 
 173. E.g., Steven A, Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004); cf. David K. Shipler, Why Do Innocent People 
Confess?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at SR6 (stating that false confessions have figured in a 
quarter of the wrongful convictions identified by the Innocence Project and that because “DNA 
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interrogator succeeds in overcoming a suspect’s silent resistance and 
eliciting an incriminating statement appears “only loosely related to 
the suspect’s actual guilt.”174 Moreover, because most cases involving 
disputed confessions are “unreported by the media, unacknowledged 
by police and prosecutors, and unrecognized by researchers, the 
documented cases of interrogation-induced false confessions almost 
certainly understate the true extent of the phenomenon.”175 
Early encounters with suspects and witnesses in which police 
produce rather than discover evidence are significant sources of 
epistemic incompetence at trial. That is true of witness interviews and 
eyewitness identifications,176 and it is a particularly acute problem 
when it comes to interrogations. Often inadvertently, law 
enforcement can create and then misattribute evidence.177 According 
to Dan Simon, “almost all of the DNA exonerees who falsely 
confessed provided detailed accounts of their purported criminal act” 
including “details that were not publicly known” and were “somehow 
communicated to the ignorant innocent confessors.”178 Simon’s 
analysis also underscores why criminal adjudication can be a poor 
audit mechanism for invalid co-authored confessions. The very 
factors that make a false confession unreliable contribute to the rich 
narratives that make them appear credible. One of Miranda’s fiercest 
critics, Ronald Allen, has asked why it would “be a better world if 
some randomly chosen set of individuals, who otherwise would 
confess, did not?”179 The empirical and social science insights of the 
 
is available in just a fraction of all crimes, a much larger universe of erroneous convictions—and 
false confessions—surely exists”).  
 174. MEDWED, supra note 170 (focusing on prosecutorial decision making and biased 
processing of evidence such as false confessions); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 139. 
 175. Richard A. Leo, False Confessions and the Constitution: Problems, Possibilities, and 
Solutions, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 171 
(John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013); see also Gross & O’Brien, supra note 166, at 
937–40 (noting that we “have inadequate information about the underlying investigations” in 
cases of false convictions “and we cannot compare them to correct convictions because we know 
even less about the investigations that lead to criminal convictions in general”). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46; see also GARRETT, supra note 16, at 8–9 
(identifying tainted eyewitness identifications as another prominent cause of wrongful 
convictions). 
 177. See Leo, supra note 125, at 198 (“American police interrogation has no internal 
corrective mechanism to catch or reverse investigators’ pre-interrogation classification errors or 
their confirmatory, information-conveying interrogation techniques.”). 
 178. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 136. 
 179. Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 205, 212 (2007). 
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new reliability scholarship provide the answer: because some of those 
“lost” confessions would have been inaccurate. 
Recognizing the connection between silence and reliability helps 
to move the discussion about regulating interrogations beyond the 
question of whether silence protects the innocent as well as the guilty. 
Jeremy Bentham long ago advanced the idea that only guilty suspects 
choose silence, and that any false evidence against innocent suspects 
who talk will be detected and rejected in the marketplace of 
adjudication. A well-known passage from his 1825 treatise states that 
if “all the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a system 
after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would 
have established for their security? Innocence never takes advantage 
of it; innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the 
privilege of silence.”180 
Scholars have been debating whether silence weighs in favor of 
the innocent or the guilty ever since, using various social science and 
theoretical lenses.181 Daniel Seidmann and Alex Stein, for example, 
constructed a game theory model to counter Bentham’s utilitarian 
approach.182 In their account, the right to silence lowers the conviction 
rate for innocents by making their exculpatory accounts believable. 
Guilty criminals stay silent rather than offer dishonest exculpatory 
accounts, and because their stories do not “pool” with those of 
innocents, true exonerating accounts emerge as more credible.183 In 
contrast, Larry Laudan and Erik Lillquist recently made a claim 
echoing Bentham’s, that protections around silence “seem to work 
primarily to the advantage of the guilty defendant and to do little if 
anything to protect the interests of innocent ones.”184 
 
 180. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (1825). 
 181. Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged 
Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 564–68 
(1999) (suggesting that many cases treated as “wrongful convictions” do not involve factually 
innocent defendants), with Schulhofer, supra note 69, at 562 (“Miranda does not protect 
suspects from conviction but only from a particular method of conviction.”).  
 182. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 433 (2000) (“[T]he 
right to silence helps to distinguish the guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling 
effect that enhances the credibility of innocent suspects.”); Alex Stein, The Right to Silence 
Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2008) (“The right 
to silence minimizes this pooling effect, thereby reducing the incidence of wrongful convictions, 
by providing guilty criminals a strong incentive to separate from the pool.”).  
 183. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 182, at 433.  
 184. Larry Laudan & Erik Lillquist, The Sounds of Silence 4 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law 
Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 215, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.
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Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not only a “shelter to the guilty” but also a 
“protection to the innocent,”185 some Justices have expressed similar 
skepticism about the connection between silence and innocence. 
Justice Cardozo remarked that justice “would not perish if the 
accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.”186 And 
Justice Scalia declared—in an opinion referencing the anticoercion 
rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination—that while the 
guilty face the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or 
contempt, the innocent “lack[] even a ‘lemma.’”187 
Versions of Justice Scalia’s conception of the carefree innocent 
defendant surface in commentary on the Fifth Amendment as well. 
Ronald Allen and Kristen Mace agree that “an innocent person faces 
no trilemma.”188 Stephen Schulhofer, who otherwise supports the 
privilege, concludes that the innocent defendant “faces no trilemma, 
no dilemma, in fact no problem at all.”189 Relatedly, Judge Richard 
Posner has written that judges “who want jurors to take seriously the 
principle that guilt should not be inferred from a refusal to waive the 
privilege against self-incrimination will have to come up with a 
credible explanation for why an innocent person might fear the 
consequences of testifying” and has questioned whether there is any 
such “credible explanation.”190 
But of course there are many explanations for refusing to speak 
within the criminal justice process, including the realities of stress, 
fear, anger, and confusion in any law enforcement encounter. As the 
Tenth Circuit has observed, it is “common knowledge that most 
citizens . . . whether innocent or guilty, when confronted by a law 
enforcement officer who asks them potentially incriminating 
 
com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2037575_code515373.pdf?abstractid=2037575&mirid=1 [http://
perma.cc/4CUV-58UK].  
 185. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting Quinn v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908). 
 186. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
 187. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55).  
 188. Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its 
Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 244 (2004). 
 189. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 318 (1991). 
 190. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1477, 1534–35 (1999). 
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questions are likely to exhibit some signs of nervousness.”191 
Relatedly, Matthew Martoma, who was recently convicted of 
securities fraud, successfully moved to preclude from his trial any 
discussion of the fact that he fainted when first approached by FBI 
agents investigating the case.192 “The mere accusation,” the trial court 
agreed, “could well have an enormous impact on [the accused’s] 
professional and personal life,” and “it is just as likely that he fainted 
simply from shock, surprise, or alarm at being accused of such a 
serious crime.”193 
Moreover, the idea that innocents have nothing to fear from 
responding to police is flat wrong. Innocent defendants have good 
reason for distrusting authority and holding their peace. Silence may 
be not only a powerful instinct but also the best strategy, even for the 
factually innocent.194 Factually innocent suspects confront quite 
weighty “lemmas” of their own. They choose speech or silence, and if 
they speak, they elect whether to tell partial truths to enhance their 
otherwise honest account of innocence. Any statements they give can 
cause tactical damage to their later positions at trial, by compromising 
an alibi or by creating impeachment material from small 
inconsistencies. As Justice Breyer recognized, dissenting in Salinas, a 
suspect who answers an accusatory question may reveal “prejudicial 
facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circumstances—even if he 
is innocent.”195 Investigators approach suspects with a tendency to 
perceive them as guilty, and almost anything a suspect says will serve 
to confirm that suspicion.196 To make matters worse, defensive 
dishonesty by an innocent defendant can give rise to liability for an 
entirely new offense, such as obstruction or a false statement.197 
 
 191. United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 192. Order at 1, 4, United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014).  
 193. Id. at 3. 
 194. See, e.g., Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here are many reasons 
why a defendant may remain silent before arrest, such as a knowledge of his Miranda rights or a 
fear that his story may not be believed.”); Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430, 450–51 (Pa. 
2014) (“[A]llowing reference to a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence endangers the 
truth-determining process given our recognition that individuals accused of a crime may remain 
silent for any number of reasons.”).  
 195. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 196. Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “You’re Guilty So Just Confess!” Cognitive 
and Behavioral Confirmation Biases in the Interrogation Room, in INTERROGATIONS, 
CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 85, 89 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). 
 197. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1522 (2009). 
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Innocents under interrogation also face the compound danger 
that they will be manipulated into an inculpatory falsehood, and that 
this “confession” will lead to their conviction. Innocence may even 
supply the requisite circumstances for a false confession. It can be a 
risk factor for wrongful convictions because of the misguided notion 
that innocence is its own defense. Innocent suspects tend to believe 
that the truth will eventually “set them free” and that they have little 
to lose from cooperating and engaging with law enforcement.198 The 
game theory model also assumes that “innocent defendants have only 
one rational course of action,” which is “revealing their true self-
exonerating accounts.”199 That is not quite right either, however. The 
most rational course of action is to say nothing at all, and that is 
exactly what any competent lawyer would advise.200 
In other words, the prosecutor in Salinas was simply incorrect 
that any innocent person questioned about the shotgun casings would 
have responded, “What are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I 
wasn’t there.”201 As the Supreme Court has previously stated—when 
concluding that a defendant’s invocation of a Fifth Amendment 
privilege before a grand jury cannot be used to impeach his later trial 
testimony—silence in the face of questioning can be “wholly 
consistent with innocence.”202 There is “no basis for declaring a 
generalized probability” that the innocent are more likely than the 
guilty to profess their innocence.203 Silence accurately responds as far 
as it goes, protects against untrue statements and untoward 
inferences, and preserves other rights surrounding the later decisions 
about whether to proceed to trial and whether to testify. 
 
 198. For an account of how innocence increases the risk of false confessions, see generally 
Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005).  
 199. Stein, supra note 182, at 1122–23. Seidmann and Stein’s express concern is to model the 
positive effect of silent guilty defendants on testifying innocent ones, and as they acknowledge 
“[t]he existence of silent innocents does not enter” into their model. Seidmann & Stein, supra 
note 182, at 455 n.82. 
 200. As Justice Jackson plainly stated, “[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no 
uncertain terms to make no statement to the police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana, 
338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 201. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 202. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957). 
 203. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring). 
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C. The Cost of Silence 
Further argument against a robust right to silence focuses on the 
false negatives it would produce in order to prevent false positives.204 
Larry Laudan, for example, claims that victims of crime bear some of 
the costs of mitigating wrongful convictions (type I errors). In his 
view, lowering the false acquittal rate (thereby reducing type II 
errors) is equally if not more desirable.205 According to Laudan and 
Lillquist’s recent challenge to protections around silence, “[w]hile it is 
plausible that the frequency of false convictions would fall in the 
transition from weak to strong silence regimes, it is even more likely 
that the same transition will bring in its wake a larger rise in the 
frequency of false acquittals.”206 False acquittals, however, are an 
unquantifiable construct. Despite the fact that type II errors must 
occur, one cannot say with any confidence how many, or for what 
reason. 
Logically, protecting silence will incentivize some guilty 
defendants to withhold information. But the cost in terms of lost 
convictions is theoretical. There is no population of “known guilties” 
who are wrongly acquitted207 comparable to the growing dataset 
containing “known innocents.”208 The requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt makes attribution of acquittal to any particular 
source, like a suppressed confession, speculative.209 Nor are there any 
 
 204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 618 n.2 (6th ed. 2003) 
(assuming a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors as a result of exclusionary rules); ALEX 
STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172 (2005) (“The legal system can . . . reduce the 
incidence of wrongful acquittals (‘false negatives’) by increasing the number of wrongful 
convictions (‘false positives’), and vice versa.”).  
 205. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 130 (2008). 
 206. Laudan & Lillquist, supra note 184, at 49; see also, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry 
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 84 (2008) (“Likewise, many of the 
remedies for reducing the number of false convictions increase the risk of false acquittals, and 
with it, the risk of rising crime vindication.”).  
 207. But see Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC., at iii, xvi (2015) (noting that wrongful convictions “often result in another injustice or 
series of injustices” because along with the conviction of an innocent man “a guilty man is left 
free and emboldened to victimize others”). 
 208. See Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [http://perma.cc/T3C9-QJPV] (documenting 
1635 exonerations as of August 2015).  
 209. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 188 
(2008) (stating that there is “strong evidence that coercive techniques increase the odds of a 
false confession . . . but we do not know by how much . . . [and] [i]t is possible, for all we know, 
that the overwhelming majority of coerced confessions are true”). 
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base rates of innocent and guilty suspects in police interrogations 
against which false confessions can be measured.210 
Nonetheless, debate about the costs and benefits of the Miranda 
rule often coalesces around the lost information it may cause.211 The 
specter of unstated confessions looms large because they are widely 
regarded as high value evidence,212 even sometimes referred to as the 
“queen of proof.”213 The Supreme Court has at times reflected this 
idea that confessions are “essential to society’s compelling interest in 
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law,”214 and 
has declared that they are “like no other evidence.”215 But the Court 
has also stated that “a system of criminal law enforcement which 
comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less 
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on 
extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation.”216 
Confessions are treacherous not only because they are subject to 
abuses but also because they are convincing.217 Many people assume 
 
 210. Rassin & Israëls, supra note 147, at 221; cf. Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843, 
861–62 (Mass. 2014) (upholding the exclusion of testimony about factors present in 150–200 
documented cases of false confessions because the expert could cite no studies comparing the 
prevalence of those factors among false confessions to their incidence in confessions as a 
whole). 
 211. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An 
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 (1996) (“[A] total of 
18.6% of the suspects in our sample who were given Miranda rights invoked them before police 
succeeded in obtaining incriminating information.”). On the empirical debate, see generally 
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 
(1996), and Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996). 
 212. See, e.g., People v. House, 566 N.E.2d 259, 282 (Ill. 1990) (“[A] system which relies not 
at all upon the confession will, in many instances where extrinsic evidence is lacking or 
inconclusive, be incapable of protecting society from perhaps the most cunning criminal 
elements which threaten it.”). 
 213. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 14 (1978) 
(“The maxim of the medieval Glossators, no longer applicable to European law, now aptly 
describes American law: confessio est regina probationum, confession is the queen of proof.”). 
 214. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).  
 215. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“[T]he defendant’s own confession is 
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” 
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (White, J. dissenting))).  
 216. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1964); see also Allen & Mace, supra note 
188, at 264 (“There are strong policy reasons for not wanting to rely on evidence from someone 
who has an incentive to hide the truth.”).  
 217. See Seidman, supra note 129, at 164 (explaining that confessions mislead because they 
“present the illusion of escape when there is no escape: confessions are always just another 
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that confessions, given their incriminating nature, must be true. 
Police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors all want to believe them 
because they offer unique access to the defendant’s own thoughts. 
They seem self-authenticating, have false precision,218 contain potent 
prejudice,219 and potentially bias the perceptions and decision-making 
of criminal justice officials and fact-finders alike.220 Indeed, the 
presence of a false confession can delay or derail an exoneration even 
after DNA testing conclusively establishes factual innocence.221 
Confessions have a persuasive force so enduring that they can 
actually outweigh scientific evidence.222 They simply override 
powerful contradictory information like forensics because they 
further narrow the official tunnel vision that can keep the criminal 
justice system from self-correcting when error occurs.223 
Even if it were the case that criminal justice reforms should be 
neutral with regard to the direction of the error corrected—that 
wrongful acquittals are as bad as wrongful convictions224—there is no 
 
mask”); cf. Peter Brooks, Speech, Silence, the Body, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 33, 190, 211 (commenting that custodial interrogations are so “crude” and 
“weighted” that we may not “wish [suspects] to speak freely”).  
 218. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 485 (“Confessions are among the most powerful forms 
of evidence introduced in a court of law, even when they are contradicted by other case 
evidence and contain significant errors.”).  
 219. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[n]o other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial”). 
 220. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 520 n.273 (“Researchers have demonstrated that mock 
jurors find confession evidence more incriminating than any other type of evidence.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html 
[http://perma.cc/L3JX-QQAA] (discussing the case of Juan Rivera, who signed a false 
confession that was instrumental to his conviction at three successive trials, including one that 
occurred after DNA evidence excluded him as the perpetrator).  
 222. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 404–08 (discussing exoneration cases in which 
contaminated confessions trumped the DNA evidence pointing to innocence). 
 223. See Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOL. 431, 441 
(2012) (“[F]alse confessions, once taken, arouse a strong inference of guilt, thereby unleashing a 
chain of confirmation biases that make the consequences difficult to overcome despite 
innocence.”); see also Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests “Innocent,” Some 
Prosecutors Cling to “Maybe,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/16/ us/ dna-evidence-of-innocence-rejected-by-some-prosecutors.html [http://perma.cc/CLP4-
5WJP]; Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Innocent Defendants: 
Divergent Case Outcomes and What They Teach Us, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 78 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014). 
 224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 216 (1990) 
(“[T]he only way to reduce the probability of convicting the innocent is to reduce the 
probability of convicting the guilty as well.”); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1408 (1991) (“[A] guilt-innocence 
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empirical basis to conclude that silence fails to enhance net accuracy. 
Stronger protections could reduce the overall number of statements 
suspects make, but it is not clear that the lost statements include a 
significant number of accurate confessions. Compliance and 
correctness are not the same thing. Generating more incriminating 
evidence in the investigative process does not necessarily mean that 
police have received more reliable information. Moreover, the 
speculative value of missing confessions no longer weighs heavily 
against the real data and concrete details about false statements that 
have contributed to wrongful convictions.225 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERROGATION REGULATION 
If silence indeed communicates the desire to separate from law 
enforcement, and the failure to let it speak for itself hazards 
inaccuracy, how could courts fashion more silence-sensitive rules 
around interrogations? Even as the low costs and considerable gains 
of preventing government-created evidence grow clearer, the force of 
Miranda’s protections has diminished. The Court’s inconsistent 
reasoning about waiver and invocation might be reconciled through 
new insights about silence. Reconsidering the connection between 
due process exclusion and reliability could also improve the courts’ 
mechanisms for screening out government-created evidence. The 
most promising applications, however, may be changes to law 
enforcement practices on the ground. Reliability concerns have 
recently contributed to widespread recording of interrogations. That 
increased transparency could in turn encourage other reforms, 
including limiting the length of time silent suspects can be 
interrogated, and clarifying the notice they receive. 
 
neutral approach to error-allocation has the effect of removing error-allocation as a concern 
separate from error-avoidance.” (emphasis omitted)); Larry Laudan, Is It Finally Time to Put 
“Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Out to Pasture 17–18 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series Ser. No. 194, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID18153
21_code515373.pdf?abstractid=1815321&mirid=1 [http://perma.cc/2PSW-59Z4] (arguing that 
recommendations for additional protections to prevent false convictions “fail to acknowledge 
the very serious costs associated with false acquittals”). 
 225. See False Confessions, Understand the Causes, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocence project.org/understand/False-Confessions.php [http://perma.cc/T7KE-9XD9] 
(“[M]ore than 1 out of 4 people wrongfully convicted but later exonerated . . . made a false 
confession or incriminating statement.”); % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonera
tionsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx [http://perma.cc/8S4B-4YDL] (attributing 13 percent of 
exonerations to date to false confessions).  
GRIFFIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2015  1:38 AM 
736 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:697 
A. Space for Silence 
First, correcting the asymmetry between silent waiver and 
express invocation would form more protective space around silence, 
give the decision to stay silent some procedural consequence, and 
make it more likely that a suspect will maintain silence and avoid 
introducing inaccuracies.226 To do so would also give effect to the 
Miranda Court’s statements that the right to remain silent can be 
invoked “in any manner,” and that there is a “heavy burden” for the 
government to establish waiver.227 The practical realities of 
interrogations bear little resemblance to the balance the Miranda 
Court envisioned. Fully 80 percent of suspects who receive Miranda 
warnings waive their rights,228 and almost none assert or reassert them 
once questioning has begun.229 Moreover, when reviewing cases of 
disputed waiver and disputed invocation, courts construe ambiguity in 
favor of admitting suspects’ statements. Indeed, some datasets 
indicate that courts are ten times as likely to find waiver as to 
conclude that the suspect retained Fifth Amendment protections.230 
Police should, however, be as willing to recognize indirect 
assertions of silence as they are to proceed after implicit waivers. Or 
at least they should ask clarifying questions about ambiguous 
requests.231 Whereas the willingness to submit to questioning is 
assumed from almost any response a suspect gives law enforcement—
including no response at all—invoking the right to have silence and 
 
 226. Compare Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (invocation of the right to 
counsel must be “unambiguous”), with North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) 
(waiver need not be formal and can be inferred “from the actions and words of the person 
interrogated”). 
 227. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475–476 (1966).  
 228. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 211, at 859 (reporting that the waiver rate is 83.7 
percent); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report 
Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (2007). Most of those 
suspects have experience of the criminal justice system. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286–87 (1996). On the rate of, and 
reasons for, waiver, see also supra text accompanying notes 130–34.  
 229. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 37, at 977 (“[O]nce suspects agree to talk to the police, they 
almost never call a halt to questioning or invoke their right to have the assistance of counsel.”). 
 230. See, e.g., George C. Thomas, III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1972–
73 (2004). 
 231. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE 
LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (2005) (describing how police procedures such as 
clarifying questions could solve evidence-related issues when suspects make ambiguous waiver 
requests).  
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cut off questioning requires a hyperliteral assertion.232 But invocation 
is more request than offer, and one that many suspects will make 
indirectly.233 Some groups of suspects, including women and 
minorities, may be even more likely to speak in a pattern that falls 
short of a clear assertion.234 Although savvy suspects may use the 
requisite words and take the necessary tone, vulnerable and 
inexperienced ones rarely succeed in maintaining sufficient space for 
silence.235 
Of course, nothing formally prevents a suspect from simply 
staying quiet, no matter how insistent the questioning. But revealing 
the incidence of false confessions has also demonstrated that the right 
to be silent often requires the corresponding protection of having 
silence. At the very least, a close look at the elements of false 
confessions suggests that invocation and waiver should be self-
executing to the same extent.236 
Recasting the function of silence as space for reflection and a 
protection against undue inference seems to support a more 
pragmatic approach to recognizing invocation. It is important to 
acknowledge, however, that any expanded interpretation of 
Miranda’s requirements seems unlikely. According to Richard Leo, 
“the Miranda ritual makes almost no practical difference in American 
police interrogation” because almost all suspects waive their rights, 
and with respect to the rest, police “have developed multiple 
strategies to avoid, circumvent, nullify, and sometimes violate 
Miranda and its invocation rules in their pursuit of confession 
evidence.”237 Moreover, there is an argument that Miranda makes 
matters worse for suspects by insulating subsequent coercive 
 
 232. See Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops & Robbers: Selective Literalism in 
American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 256 (2004) (explaining that many judges 
require a suspect to explicitly invoke his or her right to cut-off questioning). 
 233. Cf. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) (“We recognize that requiring a 
clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, 
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate 
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”).  
 234. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 315–19 (1993).  
 235. Stuntz, supra note 37, at 977.  
 236. See, e.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified Theory of Testimonial 
Evidence Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1190 (2007).  
 237. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 124 (2008); see 
also Stuntz, supra note 37, at 976 (noting that the effects of Miranda have been “small, perhaps 
vanishingly so”).  
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techniques from scrutiny.238 The doctrine now serves “mostly as a 
weapon to negate claims of coercion.”239 
Nor would it be realistic to expect any doctrinal fortification of 
Miranda. In forty-one of the forty-eight Supreme Court terms since 
Miranda was decided, the Court has considered at least one case 
interpreting its requirements. Those decisions have significantly 
contracted and only rarely expanded its reach. For example, physical 
evidence obtained as a result of Miranda violations is not subject to 
suppression,240 statements taken after infringing on Miranda can still 
be introduced for impeachment,241 the definitions of custody and 
interrogation have constricted the circumstances under which the 
right applies,242 and the public safety exception has limited its scope as 
well.243 According to Barry Friedman, the Court has actually 
overruled Miranda by “stealth.”244 Charles Weisselberg, who wrote in 
the late 1990s about paths to “saving” the decision, resigned himself a 
decade later to pronouncing it dead and “mourning” it.245 
 
 238. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (2010) (“Miranda has been gutted as a legal matter, and 
as a factual matter its impact might very well be perverse.”); see also BROOKS, supra note 33, at 
11 (“A cynical interpretation of the Court’s decision in Miranda would say that the Court cut 
the Gordian knot of the problem of voluntariness by saying to the police: if you follow these 
forms, we’ll allow that the confession you obtained was voluntary.”); SEIDMAN, supra note 32, 
at 102 (“Physical violence is still out of bounds, but the courts today regularly permit the kind of 
police threats, fabrication, and manipulation that might well have led to suppression of 
statements in the pre-Miranda era—so long, that is, as Miranda’s warning and waiving ritual is 
duly observed.”).  
 239. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 139; see also id. (“For all practical purposes, the 
voluntariness of the waiver seems to legitimize the questionable interrogative methods that 
follow in its wake and to absolve the interrogator of any responsibility for inducing the suspect 
to falsely incriminate himself.”); Leo et al., supra note 150, at 498 (“[B]y focusing on the proper 
reading and waiver of the Miranda warnings, trial judges often appear to avoid the more 
difficult task of analyzing whether police pressures have overborne the suspect’s decision-
making capacity or whether the confession is, in fact, a reliable piece of evidence.”).  
 240. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004). 
 241. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
 242. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980). 
 243. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984). 
 244. Friedman, supra note 238, at 16. On the extent to which Miranda has been functionally 
overruled, see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 
(2004); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 984 
(2012); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation 
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092–95 (2003) (book review). 
 245. Compare Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 177 
(1998) (arguing that the “original vision” of Miranda “provides substantial protection to Fifth 
Amendment values, fits with our constitutional jurisprudence, provides necessary bright-line 
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Furthermore, thousands of pieces of scholarship discussing those 
decisions have not substantially altered the restrictive direction of the 
precedents.246  
There is no meaningful, durable right to silence in interrogations, 
and there does not seem to be any momentum behind creating one 
through Miranda jurisprudence. The Miranda warnings “may be the 
most famous words ever written” by the Supreme Court.247 Indeed, 
they have become so thoroughly engrained that the Court accounted 
for their status as “part of our national culture” in declining to 
overrule Miranda in Dickerson v. United States.248 But the perception 
that warning suspects somehow inhibits law enforcement and 
precludes confessions is similarly entrenched.249 Miranda may be not 
only the best-known criminal law decision,250 but also the most 
vigorously critiqued.251 The opinion is thus all but a dead letter, and it 
provides little scaffolding to construct significant protective space 
around silence. 
B. Implementing Reliability 
Accordingly, it might be more realistic to focus on extra-Miranda 
interventions that could address the ambiguity of silence, and in doing 
so interpose some barriers to interrogation-induced evidence. The 
 
rules for police and trial judges, and maintains public confidence in our courts and police”), with 
Weisselberg, supra note 74, at 1521, 1592 (concluding that the Miranda rule does not “afford 
many suspects a meaningful way to assert their Fifth Amendment rights” and is “largely dead” 
“[a]s a prophylactic device to protect suspects’ privilege”). 
 246. Cf. Ronald J. Allen, The Gravitational Pull of Miranda’s Blackhole: The Curious Case 
of J.D.B. V. North Carolina, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 143, 146 (2013) (noting the “vast and 
tedious” literature on Miranda).  
 247. Leo, supra note 66, at 671. 
 248. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).  
 249. See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, 
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 163 (2007) (stating that 
Miranda is “one of the most praised, most maligned—and probably one of the most 
misunderstood—Supreme Court cases in American history”); see also Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 2466, 2479 (1996) (“Yet given the vociferous outcry against Miranda, which was clearly 
the most notorious (to detractors) of the Warren Court’s criminal decisions, Miranda’s basic 
requirements . . . have remained largely, even surprisingly, unaltered.”). 
 250. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. 
L. REV. 551, 551 (2007) (“Miranda v. Arizona is probably the most widely recognized court 
decision ever rendered.” (footnote omitted)).  
 251. See, e.g., FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6–7 (1970) (discussing the 
political backlash against Miranda and the decision’s timing in the midst of escalating crime 
rates). 
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right to silence, to the extent there is one, is enforced as a matter of 
due process as well.252 Miranda displaced but did not replace the 
totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine whether law 
enforcement coerced a suspect’s statement.253 That inquiry may have 
sufficient elasticity to incorporate the insights of the new reliability, 
and a renewed focus on silence itself might in turn produce a more 
workable due process test. 
The question of whether police “overbore” a suspect’s will 
bedeviled courts in the Due Process Clause cases that predated the 
Miranda decision. Identifying the incentives of law enforcement poses 
a stubborn problem, and it would be unworkable to simply substitute 
an inquiry into the state of mind of the interrogator for an assessment 
of the suspect’s experience of coercion. Generally speaking, the Court 
has declined to consider the subjective motivations of law 
enforcement.254 But focusing on a suspect’s initial silence and then 
considering the circumstances surrounding its breach could clarify 
whether police engaged in an “improper practice.”255 
Moreover, one way of conceptualizing coercion is to ask whether 
suspects have been led to believe that they do not have the option to 
stay silent. And the actual words and actions surrounding silence 
include objective markers of the subjective experience of having no 
choice. Even if it is hard to say, absent physical abuse, whether a 
suspect was “forced” to implicate himself, information closer to the 
surface about the interrogation—including how long periods of 
silence lasted and how suggestive the questions and statements were 
in the interim—could expose whether the government applied undue 
pressure.256 
 
 252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 253. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process 
and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 178–79 (2005). 
 254. E.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (per curiam) (“[O]fficers’ 
subjective and undisclosed suspicions . . . do not bear upon the question whether [a suspect is] in 
custody, for purposes of Miranda, during the station house interview.”).  
 255. See Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 957 
(1997) (“Courts should define the term coerced confession to mean a confession caused by 
offensive governmental conduct, period.”). But see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to 
Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449–50, 536 (2002) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment 
protects only against the admission of compelled statements in court and does not regulate 
police conduct).  
 256. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 97 (calling the “voluntariness/compulsion focus” 
“misguided” because “the question we should ask is whether police interrogation techniques 
invade a protected private sphere by abusing intimacy and illusions of intimacy and, if so, 
whether that invasion and abuse are justifiable”); Allen, supra note 179, at 213 (“The only thing 
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The empirical findings of the new reliability advocacy and 
scholarship, and the connection between failures in the system and 
co-authorship by the government, suggest that the due process 
analysis ought to reference accuracy concerns. The Supreme Court 
has displayed some ambivalence about including reliability 
determinations in the calculus of fair procedures. Although some 
Justices accept that the goal of ascertaining truth animates due 
process,257 the Court has also stated that unreliability “is a matter to 
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”258 Recently, in 
Perry v. New Hampshire,259 the Court ruled that the Constitution does 
not demand an inquiry into the reliability of eyewitness-identification 
evidence obtained under unreliable conditions.260 
Fairness, voluntariness, and reliability overlap, however. While 
different values, they often move in the same direction. “Making” a 
suspect speak can violate autonomy principles, and the statements 
that follow an improper breach of silence also occur in infelicitous 
conditions—such as prolonged interrogations or threatening 
questions—that diminish the quality and reliability of a confession. 
The question is not merely whether law enforcement extracted a 
statement improperly, but also whether it created that statement in 
the process.261 As Stephen Schulhofer has argued, if “officers were 
 
that can be done is precisely what the voluntariness test tried to do—array the forces brought to 
bear on an individual and work out the line separating the acceptable from the unacceptable 
inductively.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The State’s obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth 
emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair trial under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 258. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (citation omitted).  
 259. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
 260. Id. at 730 (“[W]e hold that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary 
judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was 
not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”).  
 261. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
729, 739–41 (2008) (defining statements taken in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination as the ‘compelled products of compelled cognition’); Allen & Mace, supra note 
188, at 267 (“The government may not compel revelation of the incriminating substantive 
results of cognition caused by the state.” (emphasis added)); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating 
Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 400 (2012) (“Evidence created without provocation by the 
government is not compelled . . . .”); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Revealing and Thereby Tempering 
the Abuses of Government-Created Evidence in Criminal Trials, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1277 
(2010) (citing the “corrupting influence of the government‘s hand in the evidence development 
process”).  
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told it was permissible (and perhaps therefore their duty) to use all 
pressures short of actually breaking the suspect’s will,” then “there 
can be little doubt that more abuses would occur, even though the 
worst abuses would still be theoretically prohibited by other rules.”262 
Those abuses include co-authoring statements that seem to have the 
“epistemic authority” of the defendant263 and thereby also resist 
market corrections in the adversarial process.264 
At first glance, considerations of a confession’s reliability appear 
to implicate the same unpredictability that references to coercion 
engender.265 Although impossible to say with certainty whether a 
suspect spoke as an act of free will,266 introducing the concept of sole 
authorship could help shape a sturdier test.267 One of the key sources 
of wrongful convictions, according to the new reliability literature, is 
the set of situations in which suspects or witnesses have little choice 
but to say something, and law enforcement participates in what they 
say.268 Indeed, several studies suggest that police-induced false 
confessions go hand in hand with psychological coercion.269 
Determining whether there has been government participation will 
not capture every situation of coercion, and adding that element 
 
 262. Schulhofer, supra note 189, at 326.  
 263. See Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2008) (defining testimony as “any evidence that requires reliance 
by the fact-finder on the epistemic authority of the defendant”).  
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 217–23 (on the durability of false confessions).  
 265. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004) (reasoning that a multi-factored 
test runs afoul of Miranda’s status as “an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the 
police”); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 981 (explaining that the voluntariness standard “could not 
separate good police tactics and good confessions from bad ones”); see also Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (noting that the “hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry” includes 
“a ‘complex of values’” (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960))).  
 266. See SEIDMAN, supra note 32, at 79 (without the “natural law baselines” that previously 
distinguished freedom and coercion, “these distinctions, upon which the Fifth Amendment rests, 
become very difficult to maintain”); Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 71, 76 (2006) (criticizing Miranda’s conception of free will as unattainable because all 
choices are conditioned by reasons).  
 267. Cf. Peter Brooks, The Future of Confession, 1 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 53, 60 
(2005) (“Where psychology brings ambiguity and complexity and layering of motive, the Court 
wants certainty and bright lines.”).  
 268. GARRETT, supra note 16, at 19–20 (discussing characteristics of contaminated 
confessions). 
 269. See, e.g., Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police 
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & 
SOC’Y 189, 191–92 (1997) (listing studies of psychologically induced false confessions). 
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makes the protection narrower,270 but it also makes it stronger and 
more straightforward to apply.271 
Reevaluating the significance of silence has the potential to move 
the debate about the privilege beyond the direction of possible error 
and also beyond the question whether the privilege requires 
protection via rule or standard.272 Open-textured inquiries into the 
existence of ill-defined elements like coercion carry a high risk of 
error,273 while rules allow law enforcement to adhere to a clear line, 
observing the letter but then violating the spirit of the Fifth 
Amendment in a way that would be prohibited in a more standard-
like regime.274 Moreover, Miranda’s prophylactic requirement, like 
many rules, is both under- and over-inclusive.275 Reliability is a more 
dynamic consideration, but its boundaries can be better defined 
within the frame of the particular concern about government-
creation. 
 
 270. See Medwed, supra note 164, at 1556 (noting concern about declining attention to 
defense arguments based on constitutional violations and procedural unfairness because of the 
“overwhelming noise created by the innocence movement”). 
 271. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 155 (1991) 
(concluding that there will be fewer rule-based errors if more factual predicates are added to a 
rule). By way of analogy, the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence implements 
reliability but according to a narrow concern with the potential for government manipulation. 
See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 67 
(2011); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in 
the judgment) (critiquing the majority’s insistence on a bright line rule that “adds little to a 
trial’s truth-finding function”). For an illustration of the Court’s continuing dispute about the 
relationship between a substantive reliability standard and a procedural rule that turns on 
whether a statement is testimonial, compare Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–59 (2011) 
(“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify 
some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 
2715 (2011) (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report drawn from 
machine-produced data does not overcome the [Confrontation Clause’s] bar.”). 
 272. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1495–96, 1535 (2006) (equating balancing tests with substantive reliability 
concerns and bright line rules with procedural guarantees); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Miranda 
Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2013) (noting the way in which Miranda imposes a 
rule-like construct on the standard of voluntariness by prescribing law enforcement behavior). 
 273. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 387 (1985). 
 274. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591, 599 (1981). 
 275. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 271, at 31–34; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992) (“A rule necessarily 
captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or 
under-inclusiveness.”). 
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Put another way, looking for hallmarks of co-authorship could 
add more rule-like characteristics to the reliability calculus. Richard 
Leo, for example, has suggested ways to operationalize this concern 
with accuracy: courts could determine whether a confession leads to 
the discovery of evidence previously unknown to police, whether it 
includes identification of highly unusual non-public facts, and 
whether it accurately describes mundane details of the crime as 
well.276 Courts could also look closely at indicia of a suspect’s intent 
and effort to maintain silence, the duration of that silence, and the 
information and incentives that law enforcement provided in order to 
break it. By doing so, courts could begin to evaluate the interactions 
between police and interviewees through objectively observable 
phenomena beyond the issuance of Miranda warnings.277 
Ultimately, refocusing courts on police practices at the 
intersection of waiver and invocation, or developing a due process 
test that combines elements of standards and rules to detect the 
danger of co-authorship, would face significant challenges. Miranda’s 
protections have been contracting for decades, and the Supreme 
Court has often declined to enforce alternative reliability 
guarantees.278 
C. Law Enforcement Interventions 
Even though the law of interrogations has both narrowed and 
hardened in a way that makes reform via the courts unlikely, that 
does not prevent police from implementing better practices. On-the-
ground reforms to interrogations offer perhaps the best means to 
enlarge the space for silence.279 And law enforcement has responded 
 
 276. Richard A. Leo, Peter J. Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting 
Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to 
Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 792 (2013). 
 277. Richard Leo and others have further argued for pretrial reliability assessments of 
confession evidence using the exclusionary potential of Rule 403 as the legal mechanism instead 
of the voluntariness prong of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 793; see FED. R. EVID. 403 (giving 
trial courts discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect). 
 278. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728–30 (2012) (stating that the 
“potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its introduction at the 
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair”) . 
 279. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2012) 
(book review) (“[A]djudication can serve only as a ‘backstop’ accompanying direct reform of 
the primarily investigative practices that generate error . . . .”); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The 
Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776 (2012) (arguing that judicially imposed 
constitutional restraints are inadequate to regulate law enforcement conduct); Schulhofer, supra 
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to some of the insights of recent innocentric scholarship and the social 
science on compulsion, memory, decisionmaking, and even the tunnel 
vision that investigators and prosecutors can experience. Several 
jurisdictions, for example, have established conviction integrity units 
in recent years to review potential wrongful convictions. 280 Those 
reviews have in turn informed investigative and prosecutorial tactics 
in current cases.281 
As Dan Simon has explained, interrogations are “the most 
overtly adversarial part of the criminal investigation, and thus also the 
most inimical to the portrayal of the police’s work as an impartial and 
objective search for truth.”282 Indeed, Richard Leo writes that the 
“entire interrogation process is carefully staged to hide the fact that 
police interrogators are the suspect’s adversary.”283 Leo goes on to 
describe the process of police interrogation as “firmly rooted in 
fraud.”284 This Article suggests that there is a more subtle way in 
which interrogations relate to fraud, and that is in the production of 
inaccurate statements that do not originate with the suspect. False 
confessions produce compelling evidence but yield no information. 
The process of adjusting the adversarial orientation of police at 
critical junctures where inaccuracy arises is thus essential, but also 
most likely to come from within the executive branch rather than in 
response to judicial requirements. 
 
note 65, at 892 (“One can fairly question whether anything the Court might do in this area 
would change the underlying social and political realities very much.”); Simon, supra note 153, 
at 453 (“Given the benefit of minimizing the incidence of error from the start, the criminal law 
debate has much to gain by shifting its attention from the courtroom to the police station, and 
by looking beyond constitutional protections and procedural rights toward the adequacy of the 
practices by which the evidence is produced.”). But see Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory 
for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2001) (“[S]o long as the vast bulk of police and prosecutorial 
power targets the relatively powerless (and when will that ever be otherwise?), criminal 
procedure rules that limit public power will come from the courts or they will come from 
nowhere.”). 
 280. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Prosecutors Create Unit to Find Wrongful Convictions, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-prosecutors-
create-unit-to-find-wrongful-convictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_
story.html [http://perma.cc/9EUJ-GE8W]. 
 281. See generally CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS: 
VANGUARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2014), http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Conviction-Integrity-Units.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8FX-TADA]. 
 282. SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 132. 
 283. LEO, supra note 237, at 25.  
 284. Id. 
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1. Observing Silence.  Perhaps the most frequently advocated 
reform to interrogations has been to record them.285 In May 2014, the 
Justice Department changed its longstanding policy against recording 
and established a presumption that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the United States 
Marshals Service will electronically record custodial interviews.286 
Even before the change in federal policy, many state and local 
jurisdictions had adopted mandatory recording.287 One cannot hear 
silence, but in many cases it will now be visible. Increasing use of 
recorded interrogations permits evaluation of what took place 
between police and a suspect while silence was maintained and at the 
time it was broken.288 
Ensuring a rich and accurate record of interrogations can both 
prevent coercive breaches of silence and expose them to more precise 
interpretation. Video evidence can support or refute the 
government’s claim that a suspect reacted to a guilt-assuming 
question in a telling, albeit nonverbal, way. For instance, Genovevo 
Salinas’s interrogation was not recorded, and consequently it is 
 
 285. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody 
Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128–30 (2005). Police officers who have actual 
experience of using recorded interrogations “enthusiastically support this practice.” Id. at 1128. 
 286. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the 
Assoc. Att’y Gen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Policy Concerning Electronic Recording of 
Statements (May 12, 2014), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1165406/recording-policy.
pdf [http://perma.cc/PK9M-TPGC]; see also Michael S. Schmidt, In Policy Change, Justice Dept. 
to Require Recording of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2014, at A14 . 
 287. Compare State v. Barnett, 789 A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001) (“The police need not tape 
the administration of a defendant’s Miranda rights or the defendant’s subsequent waiver of 
those rights.”), with State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“[A]ll custodial 
interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all 
questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when 
questioning occurs at a place of detention.”). Many police departments voluntarily record 
interrogations as well. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors 
and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 26 (2010). 
 288. See Leo et al., supra note 150, at 530 (“Judges can determine whether the critical details 
of the crime contained in the confession originated in the mind of the suspect or were suggested 
to the suspect by the interrogators, either inadvertently or intentionally, only by seeing or 
hearing what happened during the interrogation.”). Similar intuitions about the importance of 
seeing an exchange with law enforcement in order to increase accountability have inspired calls 
for increased use of police body cameras in the wake of the unrecorded encounter that caused 
the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. See, e.g., Require All State, County and 
Local Police to Wear a Camera, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://petitions.white
house.gov/petition/mike-brown-law-requires-all-state-county-and-local-police-wear-camera 
[http://perma.cc/J7UQ-D4VZ]. 
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difficult to say whether he indeed appeared uncomfortable when 
asked about the shotgun. As the officer who took his statement 
testified at trial, “[I]t’s been a long time ago and there’s a lot of 
details about this case and many other cases in between that.”289 
Video footage can also expose the subtle coercion that often leads 
vulnerable suspects to confess falsely. The 2011 dismissal of charges 
against Nga Truong—who had been imprisoned for three years 
awaiting trial for the murder of her infant son—came about only after 
a judge viewed the recorded interrogation that provided the sole 
evidence against her, an encounter in which she sobbed for two hours 
in the face of relentless accusatory questioning, threats, and promises 
before finally “admitting” to the killing.290 
Recording also has the advantage of revealing what may be 
inadvertent confession contamination. In most of the false 
confessions linked to wrongful convictions to date, nonpublic details 
that validated the confessions were transmitted to the suspects by law 
enforcement.291 Both what the suspect intended by her silence, and 
the external noise that intruded on it before she made any statement, 
become visible through recording. If recording is automatic rather 
than selective, a complete and continuous documentation of the 
events and sounds from the moment the suspect enters the 
interrogation room, and an account that includes the perspectives of 
both officer and suspect,292 then it can be a valuable diagnostic tool for 
the problem of government-created evidence. It can show not just the 
content of the statement produced but also the context of its 
production.293 
 
 289. Joint Appendix at 10, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246).  
 290. For the video itself and details on the case, see David Boeri, How A Teen’s Coerced 
Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.npr.org /2012/01/02/1444893
60/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-her-free [http://perma.cc/P3AV-D8RE]. 
 291. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 120, at 1068–74 (discussing five cases in which law 
enforcement either directly or inadvertently supplied non-public details in false confessions).  
 292. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 173, at 997 n.681 (reporting that only two of the 125 false 
confession cases in their study involved interrogations that had been recorded in their entirety); 
Kassin et al., supra note 287, at 25 (“[A]ll custodial interviews and interrogations of felony 
suspects should be videotaped in their entirety and with a camera angle that focuses equally on 
the suspect and interrogator.” (emphasis omitted)); see also G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. 
Geers, Ian M. Handley, Paul E. Weiland & Patrick J. Munhall, Videotaped Interrogations and 
Confessions: A Simple Change in Camera Perspective Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 867, 867–69 (2002) (noting that videotaping alone is not a technological fix 
for contaminated confessions). 
 293. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 
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Other recent reform proposals similarly focus on ensuring that a 
suspect’s words and law enforcement’s contributions can be 
distinguished. Commentators have suggested, for example, 
interrogations involving questioners other than the investigating 
detectives to minimize “false or superimposed narratives,”294 and 
formal application to courts for interviews conducted in the presence 
of magistrates.295 Scholars have also drawn attention to potential 
structural changes in interrogations—including techniques like 
cognitive interviews, conversation management, and reverse-recall 
questioning—that are designed to preserve an investigative, 
information-seeking stance and prevent the contamination of 
confessions with nonpublic facts.296 
2. Timing Silence.  What might be the simplest approach to 
protecting silence, however, has received comparatively little 
attention: limiting the length of interrogations. Reconsidering timing 
might ensure that suspects who have silently expressed the desire to 
be left alone can achieve separation, and in turn prevent the 
placement of words in their mouths. Duration of confessions is one of 
the primary risk factors for a false confession, and another is the 
 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494 (1998) (stating that recordings can assist the 
determination of voluntariness by revealing when a confession is “internally inconsistent, is 
contradicted by some of the case facts, or was elicited by coercive methods or from highly 
suggestible individuals”). 
 294. Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1660; see SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 137 
(reporting that “simulated interrogators who were led to believe (fictitiously) that the suspect 
was guilty were more inclined to ask guilt-presumptive questions, to exert stronger pressure on 
the suspect, and to use a wider variety of techniques to induce a confession, including the 
presentation of false evidence and promises of leniency”).  
 295. Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 898–900 (1995); see also SEIDMAN, supra note 32, 
at 116 (“Trading formal, carefully regulated contempt proceedings for largely unregulated, 
treacherous, and abusive station house interrogation is not an obvious loss for civil liberties.”); 
Alschuler, supra note 59, at 2667–69 (agreeing that magistrate interrogation could be preferable, 
but only with unsworn suspects who do not face sanctions for failing to answer); id. at 2669 
(noting that a list of endorsements for this “formalized” interrogation idea “reads like an honor 
role of the legal profession” (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 (1978) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting))). 
 296. See, e.g., SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 140–41 (describing the “PEACE” method 
of interrogation currently used in the United Kingdom). “Cognitive Interviews,” a protocol 
generally used with cooperative witnesses, are an attempt to develop detailed accounts from the 
witness’s own memory untainted by inaccuracies contributed by the interviewer. Id. at 118. 
“Conversation Management,” intended for uncooperative interviewees, also requires the 
investigator to play a “largely passive and facilitative role,” encourage the suspect to talk, and 
collect information from the suspect herself. Id. at 141. 
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interrogator’s conviction that the suspect is guilty.297 Better 
understanding both the fragility and the interactive nature of silence 
exposes some of the reasons why. Moreover, a clearer focus on the 
passage of time in the interrogation room may be the reform proposal 
least likely to interfere with convictions of the guilty and most likely 
to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. A suspect who first speaks 
after a prolonged interrogation may develop a desire to cooperate, or 
may just be ground down by the questioning technique, and law 
enforcement has not demonstrated the consistent ability to sort out 
which is which. 
“Speech acts” like promises have significance once uttered 
because they do something as soon as the words are said.298 Silence 
has sufficient content to “do” something as well. The communicative 
intent of silence merits interrogators’ attention, and the action of 
staying silent in the face of prolonged questioning at some point 
should have the same force as the words used to invoke rights. 
Maintained over time, silence is “very, very powerful”299 outside of 
interrogations, and should do similar work in interactions with law 
enforcement. Indeed, time matters a great deal to the meaning of 
silence.300 Brief silence during questioning may amount to a 
conversational pause, but extended, effortful silence warrants some 
protective space. Staying silent guards against being made to “recall” 
something entirely new or state complex facts in a compelling but 
misleading narrative. There is more to this protection than the 
opportunity to keep quiet; it requires freedom from extended or 
persistent questioning as well. 
 
 297. See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 137, 140 (listing the interrogator’s “initial belief,” the 
“scope and intensity” of interrogation techniques, and the ‘”duration of the interrogation” as 
factors increasing the likelihood of obtaining false statements). A recent study concerning the 
low threshold that police have for concluding that the suspects they encounter are guilty 
addressed the significance of officers’ punitive preferences when it comes to applying a standard 
like probable cause. See Richard H. McAdams, Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, The 
Law of Police, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 148 (2015). Similarly, in the interrogation room, 
questioners’ assumptions about guilty narratives can distort truth-seeking.  
 298. See generally J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975) (introducing the 
concept of a performative utterance).  
 299. Kennedy, supra note 18, at C1 (quoting Daniel Moquay’s comment on Yves Klein’s 
silent symphony and its demonstration that silence communicates). 
 300. John Cage, for example, explained that duration was the most fundamental 
characteristic of music to him. “Silence,” he wrote, “cannot be heard in terms of pitch or 
harmony: It is heard in terms of time length.” KYLE GANN, supra note 14, at 80. 
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Suspects endure lengthy interrogations and then suffer wrongful 
convictions all too often.301 This can occur either because wholly false 
confessions are made, or because partially true but incomplete and 
inaccurate statements sidetrack investigators. Even when a suspect 
stays silent in the face of questioning, law enforcement can fill the 
space with a guilt-presuming narrative, leading questions, and 
nonpublic details of the crime. If that approach then yields a false 
statement, it will in turn produce a wrongful conviction about 80 
percent of the time.302 One study concluded that the median length of 
interrogations that contributed to wrongful convictions is twelve 
hours.303 The data now available on silent innocents and tainted 
confessions provides new support for proposals such as a six-hour 
upper limit.304 Certainly, a suspect who remains silent for that length 
of time, or even less, has already made the most accurate contribution 
to the investigative process he is likely to offer. And in the event that 
a suspect later determines he would like to engage with law 
enforcement after all, the case law already contains a mechanism for 
reinitiating contact after time has passed free from questioning.305 
Suspects could also be advised, after maintaining silence for some 
period of time like three hours, that their continued silence will 
mandate an end to the encounter. 
 
 301. See SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 39, at 134 (relating the experience of Byron Halsey, 
who was wrongfully convicted and served nineteen years in prison after confessing to killing his 
two children because he “just wanted the cops to leave [him] alone” after thirty hours of 
interrogation); Garrett, supra note 8, at 402 (reporting that twenty-five of the twenty-six DNA 
exonerations over the past five years involving false confessions had interrogations that lasted 
from three to twenty-seven hours).  
 302. Leo, supra note 125, at 211. 
 303. Drizin & Leo, supra note 173, at 948. Seventeen-year-old Terrill Swift, for example, 
was interrogated for twelve hours as a suspect in a 1994 Chicago rape and murder. His false 
statements were the primary—indeed, the only—evidence supporting his conviction, and he has 
explained that several hours into the questioning “terror and exhaustion” prompted him to 
repeat what he thought police wanted to hear. He has been exonerated by DNA evidence after 
spending seventeen years in jail. See Goode, supra note 223.  
 304. White, supra note 139, at 145 n.257; see also Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of 
Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) (“In 
view of the desirability of drawing a line, it seems reasonable to say that confessions elicited 
after more than six hours of continuous interrogation should be deemed per se involuntary.”). 
The Court’s only upper limit to date comes from a case recognizing a 36-hour interrogation as 
coercive. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). 
 305. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102–03 (1975) (concluding that the assertion of Fifth 
Amendment rights does not give rise to “a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any 
further questioning”). 
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3. Silence and Notice.  Suspects might also receive more ample 
notice of what the law requires if they indeed intend to claim the right 
to silence. The standard Miranda warnings could include the 
information that interrogation will continue absent an affirmative 
request to be left alone.306 The Supreme Court has stated that no 
particular script is required for the warnings,307 and thus they could be 
modified without judicial action. Law enforcement agencies are free 
to craft a colloquy that ensures that suspects understand that they 
must verbally communicate their decision to exercise their rights in 
order to stop the questioning.308 A corollary warning that choosing 
silence will not give rise to negative inferences would also comport 
with the case law on post-Miranda invocation of the privilege.309 A 
recent study concluded that only 2 percent of police departments 
offer supplemental warnings along these lines.310 But reframing silence 
as potentially reliability-enhancing could increase that number. 
Furthermore, enhanced notice could respond to emerging 
concerns about our adversarial system of criminal justice taking an 
accusatorial turn too far upstream,311 where investigators should 
better distinguish between fact-finding and advocacy. A focus on the 
discourse and timing of warnings could put law enforcement agents 
themselves on notice of the perils of participating in the production of 
 
 306. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (discussing the role of warnings in ensuring the “right to choose between speech and 
silence” (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987))).  
 307. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 62 (2010) (concluding that warnings that “reasonably 
convey[]” a suspect’s rights satisfy Miranda). 
 308. See Richard Rogers, Kimberly S. Harrison, Daniel W. Shuman, Kenneth W. Sewell & 
Lisa L. Hazelwood, An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and 
Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 178 (2007) (arguing in favor of “allow[ing] individual 
jurisdictions to establish their specific wording so long as they convey the general requirements 
for warnings”); see also Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 584 
(2012) (discussing a proposed additional warning advising suspects that they have the right to 
terminate interrogation at any time by expressly invoking their rights). 
 309. See Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that suspects may 
elect to be silent with regard to particular questions during an interrogation without facing 
impeachment for that selective silence). On reforming the warnings to convey to suspects that 
they will not be penalized for staying silent, see Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda 
Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 783–84 
(2006). 
 310. Rogers et al., supra note 308, at 186. 
 311. Cf. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1704 (2009) 
(concluding that contrasting adversarial and inquisitorial processes “has not proven useful in 
American criminal procedure . . . because the ‘inquisitorial system’ is so ill-defined” and 
elements of both models coexist in the criminal justice system).  
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statements. If they adjusted the length and nature of questioning in 
the face of silence, they would get less material, but the material they 
did obtain would be worth more.312 
The discussion here of potential reforms focuses on those that 
protect silence itself, and on reconceptualizing silence as something 
that can be beneficial to the criminal justice process. Greater respect 
for silence can prevent both coerced statements and false ones, and it 
can improve the information conveyed in an interview when a suspect 
does choose to speak by creating a boundary around the words that 
are her own. Awareness of the nature and function of silence thus 
could increase the signals and reduce the noise in interrogations. 
CONCLUSION 
Accuracy is, or ought to be, the overriding goal of the criminal 
justice process, and recent empirical developments demonstrate that 
error in interrogations decreases the reliability of outcomes. Renewed 
and reframed protections around silence could mitigate those errors. 
Interrogation regulation should leave space to observe suspects’ 
attempts to separate from questioners, and should leverage that 
opportunity to avert co-authored confessions. Making space for 
silence could shield the context of confessions and guard against 
abusive interrogation techniques. Noticing where and how silence is 
breached could also improve the content of statements by revealing 
instances of government contamination and manipulation. 
Theorizing what silence means, accomplishes, and defends 
against requires an understanding of its dynamic nature. John Cage’s 
work and related meditations on silence call attention to the way in 
which the space around silence fills with sound from other sources—
some intentional and some unintentional. Similarly, silence forms a 
necessary boundary between a suspect’s own statements and 
information that instead stems from government sources in 
interrogations. Listening for silence, and scrutinizing the government 
speech surrounding silence, could thus be a mechanism for evaluating 
a statement’s reliability. 
This discussion of the current status and significance of silence 
suggests many further avenues of inquiry. It begins, however, to 
 
 312. Indeed, preliminary assessments of recent reforms to questioning practices in the 
United Kingdom indicate that one can eliminate many risk factors for false confessions without 
changing the rate at which confessions in general are obtained. See, e.g., Kassin et al., supra note 
287, at 27.  
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demonstrate that the link between silence and reliability is closer than 
previously thought, and a useful guidepost for future decisions about 
how to regard silence in interrogations. That the innocent profit from 
silence is no longer in any doubt, and it is time to move the debate 
beyond the costs and benefits of silence to better means of 
implementing its protections. 
 
